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Quotas and the Transatlantic Divergence of
Corporate Governance
Véronique Magnier* & Darren Rosenblum**
Abstract: The French adoption of a corporate board quota for women reflects
Europe’s increasingly stakeholder-oriented approach to corporate governance, one
that stands in marked contrast with that of the United States. This Article discusses
how the corporate board quota will shift French and European corporate
governance. The change accentuates an already established stakeholder corporate
culture widespread in Europe, most notably evidenced by the presence of worker
representation on boards. In contrast, the United States’ corporate governance
structure increasingly places the shareholder at its center. The proliferation of
quotas for women on corporate boards in the national and transnational European
contexts is a factor that will further distinguish European corporate governance
regimes from those of the United States. France’s extensive history of public
participation in private corporate governance stands in contrast with the liberal
contract and property system of the United States. These historical divergences of
stakeholder or shareholder orientations stand apart: in the United States, attention to
stakeholder inclusion has remained an academic exercise, while French and
European governance embodies substantial stakeholder inclusion. Integrating a
critical mass of women into the world’s largest economy’s corporate management
will revolutionize capital structures and the regulatory regimes that govern them.
This Article argues that quotas may serve to heighten the divide between Europe and
other regions on stakeholder/shareholder corporate governance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and Europe share a great deal in their economic
governance. As the two largest developed economies, the commonalities
have become especially apparent even as other regions develop more
rapidly.1 The move to adopt quotas for women on corporate boards,
however, signals a departure from this harmonization of corporate
governance. France’s adoption of a quota for women on corporate boards
reflects Europe’s increasingly stakeholder-oriented approach to corporate
governance. This approach recognizes that (1) shareholders, as simply the
1
For a discussion on rapid economic growth in Asia, see Steven Globerman, Mike W. Peng &
Daniel M. Shapiro, Corporate Governance and Asian Companies, 28 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 1 (2011).
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owners of a corporation’s residual interests, are but one of many entities
served by a corporation, and (2) corporate governance issues must be
expanded to all stakeholders of a company (workers, creditors, and the
environment). The passage of Law 2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on Equal
Representation of Women and Men on Corporate Boards and on Equality
in the Workplace, also known as the French Corporate Board Quota
(FCBQ), has prompted changes in the composition of current corporate
boards and a transformation in French corporate governance.2 France
adopted the FCBQ after Norway passed a similar law in 2008.3 After the
FCBQ, other European countries and regional institutions have begun
viewing quotas as a legitimate and even necessary remedy, although their
implementation has been far from homogeneous.
This corporate
governance culture stands in sharp contrast with the shareholder
governance found in the United States. Feminization, in the literal sense of
adding women participants to corporate leadership, augments the variety of
perspectives. It suggests that effective corporate governance relies on all
stakeholders’ interests, rather than merely shareholders’ interest.
This Article explores whether the addition of women board members
does in fact “feminize” the corporation.. Professor Rosenblum’s work
explores the effect of women’s presence on board governance more
2
Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des femmes et des
hommes au sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité professionnelle [Law
2011-103 of January 27, 2011 on Equal Representation of Women and Men on Corporate Boards and
on Equality in the Workplace], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 28, 2011, p. 1680.
3
AAGOTH STORVIK & MARI TEIGEN, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, WOMEN ON BOARD: THE
NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCE 1, 4 (2010), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07309.pdf; Press
Release, Regjeringen Stoltenberg II, Rules Regarding Gender Balance Within Boards of Public Limited
Companies (Aug. 12, 2005), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/bld/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/
2005/rules-regarding-gender-balance-within-bo.html?id=429993. Section 6–11a of Norway’s Companies Act
reads:

On the board of directors of public limited liabilities companies, both sexes shall be
represented in the following manner:
1.
If the board of directors has two or three members, both sexes shall be
represented.
2.
If the board of directors has four or five members, each sex shall be represented
by at least two.
3.
If the board of directors has six to eight members, each sex shall be represented
by at least three.
4.
If the board of directors has nine members, each sex shall be represented by at
least four, and if the board of directors has more members, each sex shall be
represented by at least 40 percent.
5.
The rules in no. 1 to 4 apply correspondingly for elections of deputy directors.
Lov om allmennaksjeselskaper [Public Limited Liability Companies Act] 19 des 2003 nr.
120, § 6-11a (Nor.), translated in Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act,
SCHJØDT (Feb. 26, 2009).
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specifically.4 This Article takes a broader view to comprehend the
difference between Europe and the United States by presenting the
constitutional and corporate governance backgrounds of each system.
Further, the Article exposes some of the limits of the convergentist
corporate governance theory. Some scholars, notably Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman, have argued that national corporate governance
mechanisms are on an inexorable path toward convergence, leading to the
“end of history” for corporate law in which differences between nations
eventually fade away.5 This Article demonstrates that some divergence has
taken place across the Atlantic with regard to the shareholder/stakeholder
divide, a divergence exacerbated by the adoption of corporate board quotas
in France, Norway, and elsewhere.
France’s recently adopted quota for women on corporate boards will
likely alter French and perhaps European corporate governance.6 The
quota will arguably lead to significantly more women-inclusive corporate
boards, reflecting an unarticulated supposition that the corporate board is
an appropriate site for regulating a social justice question such as sex
equality. This change accentuates the established stakeholder corporate
culture widespread in Europe, as evidenced by the presence of worker
representation on boards. In contrast, the United States remains firmly
oriented towards shareholder primacy. Recently, stock exchange, capital
market, and corporate governance reforms have, to a considerable degree,
4
See Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55
(2009). In retrospect, to some extent that article somewhat naively advocated for the institution of
quotas to improve women’s representation on corporate boards. Forthcoming work will examine the
impact of corporate board quotas on corporate governance itself. See Darren Rosenblum & Daria
Roithmayr, Sex Regimes and Corporate Governance (forthcoming).
5
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law 3 (Harvard Law
Sch., Discussion Paper No. 280, 2000), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/
papers/No280.00.Hansmann-Kraakman.pdf (“[A]t the beginning of the twenty-first century we are
witnessing rapid convergence on the standard shareholder-oriented model as a normative view of
corporate structure and governance, and we should expect this normative convergence to produce
substantial convergence as well in the practices of corporate governance and in corporate law.”).
6
Representation of women on corporate boards varies widely by country. See generally Julia J.
Redenius-Hoevermann & Daniela Weber-Rey, La représentation des femmes dans les conseils
d’administration et de surveillance en France et en Allemagne, 4 REVUE DES SOCIETES 203, 203–04
(2011). Important cultural factors explain this European disparity. In Germany, where women
traditionally have a weaker presence in professional environments, the idea of introducing quotas today
seems unrealistic. Moreover, this idea has been rejected by the German legislature, which has
contented itself with incorporating the concept into the Corporate Governance Code. For a precise and
comprehensive study, see id. In Europe today, barely one in six board members are female, with
women representing only 4% of board chairpersons. This average conceals great disparities in cultural
traditions among Member States. See Gender Balance in Decision-Making Positions, EUR. COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making (last visited May 10, 2014) (“On 14
November 2012 the European Commission proposed legislation with the aim of attaining a 40%
objective of the under-represented sex in non-executive board-member positions in publicly listed
companies, with the exception of small and medium enterprises. The aim of this new legislation is to
accelerate progress towards a better gender balance on the corporate boards of European companies.”).
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been driven by the financial crisis and have made the European stakeholder
approaches more common and popular. Even if not intended as such, the
FCBQ is part of this evolution.
Each part of the Article contrasts both national and regional
developments to depict the widening discrepancy between United States
and European corporate governance cultures. Part II briefly details the
proliferation of quotas for women on corporate boards in the national and
transnational European contexts. It also frames the shift in France and the
resistance in the United States within their respective constitutional
traditions. Part III explores the depth of the stakeholder/shareholder divide
between those two societies, which are governed by vastly distinct public and
private regimes. Part IV explores the distinction between stakeholder or
shareholder orientations of corporate governance in France and the United
States. For example, France has a long history of practical stakeholder
participation. The United States’ interest in stakeholder inclusion, in contrast,
has remained an academic exercise. Finally, Part V argues that FCBQs, both
at the national and the European Union level, will strengthen the
stakeholder orientation of European corporations and deepen the divide
between European and United States corporate governance.
A comparative project such as this poses several challenges. Beyond
the question of translation sits the incorporation of diverse legal literatures
across societies, including constitutional and corporate law frameworks.7
Describing and comparing two distinct legal cultures, each of which has its
own multiplicities,8 raises particular comparative challenges that require a
better understanding of each legal system.9 To meet those challenges, this
study employs three distinct comparative methods: functionalism,
contextualism, and discourse comparativism.10 It is a functionalist study in
7
See Catherine A. Rogers, Gulliver’s Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of Comparative Law, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 150–51 (1998) (citing UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS
97 (1997)); William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 1889, 1965 (1995); Basil Markesinis, Comparative Law—A Subject in Search of an Audience,
53 MOD. L. REV. 1, 21 (1990); Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era
of Information, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 222 (1999); see also Paula Giliker, Book Review, 55 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 243, 243 (2006) (reviewing ESIN ÖRÜCÜ, THE ENIGMA OF COMPARATIVE LAW:
VARIATIONS ON A THEME FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE
LAW (2005)).
8
Although France’s corporate governance is unitary, U.S. and European corporate governance
regulation have many parts that move in different ways. For example, Delaware law and the Securities
and Exchange Commission dominate in the United States. Federalism is one form of multiplicity;
others include language, legal pluralism, conflicting or coterminous court systems, and other differences
that reflect the law’s complexity.
9
See Riles, supra note 7, at 222; see also Giliker, supra note 7, at 243 (Örücü discusses the
difficulties that academics and students encounter in undertaking comparative research). Comparative
law provides “a glimpse into the origins of legal norms; the prospect of a better understanding of the
efficacy and limits of law; and the hope of insight into the connections among law, behavior, ideas, and
power.” Riles, supra note 7, at 238.
10
Here, we rely largely on Annelise Riles’s categorization of the field, which provides both a
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that it will describe the FCBQ’s impact and social function.11 At the same
time, the study is contextual because it incorporates the law and its
relationship to culture, as well as interdisciplinary knowledge.12 These
explicit comparisons render each system more coherent than it would
appear otherwise.13 Finally, the study uses comparative method to clarify
the cultural divide separating the United States and European corporate
governance.
II. MIXITÉ VERSUS DIVERSITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
FRAMINGS
France’s constitutional framework, which allowed the FCBQ, stands in
stark contrast to that of the United States, which would not permit quotas.
methodological and cultural distinction among these groups, recognizing the role that subjectivity plays
in scholarly production. Riles, supra note 7, at 231–51. Fabio Morosini categorizes the methods of
comparative law analysis in a different way, arguing that two different schools exist. The first, which
takes a convergence approach, focuses on the similarities between two or more legal systems. Fabio
Morosini, Globalization & Law: Beyond Traditional Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies and an
Example from Private International Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 545 (2005). The
second, non-convergence approach, distinguishes different legal systems by looking at the differences
between two or more legal systems. Id. at 546; see also Pierre Legrand, Paradoxically, Derrida: For a
Comparative Legal Studies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 665, 705 (2005) (arguing that comparatists refer
to other legal studies of the law not because they do not know other methodologies, but because they do
not want to know: “the desire not to know about otherness-in-the-law is not simple ignorance; rather, it
assumes a prescience of what it is that one does not want to know . . . .”).
11
Riles, supra note 7, at 232, 235; Morosini, supra note 10, at 546 (noting that some scholars argue
for a comparative methodology based on the differences in the laws of countries, known as the nonconvergence approach). As a defining comparative school, functionalists are accused by other
comparativists of Eurocentrism and inappropriately loose comparisons. See Riles, supra note 7, at 232,
241.
12
Riles, supra note 7, at 240–41; see also Horst Klaus Lücke, Statutory Interpretation: New
Comparative Dimensions, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1023, 1026 (2005) (reviewing STEFAN VOGENAUER,
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES IN ENGLAND AND ON THE CONTINENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
JUDICIAL JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS (2001)) (attempting to explain the
difference between interpretations of the law in different countries, particularly in common law and
civil law courts; Lücke utilizes culture to explain the divergence in interpretive methods). See generally
Günther Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411
(1985) (Frankenberg argued early on that a critical focus was imperative for methodologically sound
comparative work). Literary theory and cultural studies provide insight into a legal text’s underlying
meaning. Id.
13
Discourse scholars, in inquiring about their own legal traditions, address their subjectivity
explicitly, in part to achieve more accuracy in the description of the “other” legal system. The concept
of otherness, typically arising in critical theory with regard to group difference, also arises in the
comparative law context. See Morosini, supra note 10, at 547. This is in contrast to functionalist work.
Discourse scholars criticize functionalist work for ignoring their subjectivity. Descriptions of other
legal cultures may consist of the scholar’s projection of her own perceptions onto the ostensible
territory of study. In this “epistemological imperialism,” the study better reflects the values of the
observer rather than the observed. Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 190
(2002).
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A. France’s Corporate Board Quota and Its Impact
1. A Rigorous Quota
On January 27, 2011, France’s legislature changed the French
corporate landscape by passing Law 2011-103 on the equal representation
of men and women on boards of directors and supervisory boards.14 This
law established the principle that boards of directors and supervisory
boards of private companies or joint-stock companies of any size, listed
and unlisted, must strive for an equal representation of men and women.15
The legislature distinguished between private corporations and public
sector businesses and established minimum percentages to be met and a
schedule for attaining these objectives.
Three main categories of
corporations face regulation: (1) private companies and joint-stock
companies that issue shares admitted for trading on a regulated market; (2)
French corporations that, for three consecutive fiscal years, satisfy certain
criteria (employing at least 500 permanent staff members and producing an
annual revenue or balance sheet total of at least €50 million); and (3) public
institutions and certain businesses that are subject to the democratization
rules of the public sector. The law itself defines the aims of its legal
framework, as well as the “broad outline” of gender equality policy. It
stipulates sanctions for companies that fail to respect the aims or broad
outline imposed. Further disclosure requirements would be superfluous.16
14

See François Roche, Conseils d’administration: les femmes investissent le CAC 40, LA TRIBUNE
(July 11, 2011), http://www.latribune.fr/actualites/economie/france/20110715trib000636534/conseils-dadministration-les-femmes-investissent-le-cac-40.html; see also Benoit Marpeau, La quasi-parité
imposée au sein des conseils d’administration, LE CERCLE LES ECHOS (Feb. 21, 2011),
http://lecercle.lesechos.fr/cercle-entrepreneur/juridique/221133475/quasi-parite-imposee-sein-conseilsdadministration.
15
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] arts. L225-17, L225-69, L226-4 (Fr.).
16
These provisions are completed by the operation of the “comply or explain” rule via the
recommendations of the AFEP-MEDEF Code. Soft codification was introduced in France in the 1990s,
driven by increasing globalization in the market capitalization of the major listed companies, and thus
in response to the expectations of overseas investors. Consequently, the principles of corporate
governance were first introduced in France at the instigation of capital markets and it is manifestly in
this area that the issues of soft law and self regulation have been most strongly at work over the last
twenty years. The stages in this process to formulate flexible corporate law are well known. First, there
was the July 1995 CNPF-AFEP report on the boards of directors of listed companies (Viénot I Report).
Then came the December 1998 report on corporate governance (Viénot II Report), followed by the
October 2003 AFEP-MEDEF report on the corporate governance of listed companies (Bouton Report).
All of these reports were consolidated, at the instigation of Parliament, into a “Code of Corporate
Governance for Listed Companies” by December 2008. See infra note 17. Strictly speaking, this code
falls under the heading of soft law, insofar as companies may choose whether or not to adopt it. The
“comply or explain” rule requires only that companies choosing the latter option explain their reasons
for not adopting the rules of good corporate governance proposed in the Code of Corporate
Governance. The AFEP-MEDEF Code is a private code of corporate governance, and it is the one most
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Since 1995, several business groups have produced effective corporate
governance codes to which listed companies may voluntarily refer. These
include Viénot Reports I and II, the Bouton Report, and the AFEP-MEDEF
Report.17 Now the code of reference for companies issuing shares admitted
to trading on a regulated market, the AFEP-MEDEF Code does not bind
corporations. However, European Community law obligates the chair of
the board of directors (or supervisory board) to prepare a report on
corporate governance, including whether the firm complies with the AFEPMEDEF Code.18 Non-compliance requires explanation. The French
Financial Markets Authority (AMF) then publishes an annual report that
includes firms’ internal monitoring procedures. The Code applies to listed
firms but recommends that others adopt the rules as well. In April 2010,
the Code set certain parity objectives to be achieved progressively for
women on boards of at least twenty percent female directors within three
years and at least forty percent within six years. The AFEP-MEDEF Code
may also apply to companies outside the FCBQ’s scope.19
Before the FCBQ bill’s presentation in 2009, only ten percent of the
directors of French listed companies were female, and only five percent of
new board members were women.20 At that point, only four publicly listed
companies had reached the twenty-percent threshold.21 When the bill was
French listed companies refer to. The AFEP-MEDEF Code was drafted by the “Association française
des entreprises privées” (AFEP) and the “Mouvement des entreprises françaises” (MEDEF), the two
leading professional associations for private companies in France.
17
All of these reports were combined in a code, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listing
Companies. See Code de gouvernement d’entreprise des sociétés cotées, AFEP (June 2013), available
at http://www.afep.com/uploads/medias/documents/Code_gouvernement_entreprise_societes_cotees_
sJuin_2013.pdf.
18
See Council Regulation 384/96, of 22 December 1995 Protection Against Dumped Imports from
Countries not Members of the European Community, 1995 O.J. (L 213); Commission Decision
2008/649/EC, of 3 July 2008 regarding Council Regulation 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on Protection
Against Dumped Imports from Countries not Members of the European Community, arts. 8–9, 2008
O.J. (L 213); Directive 2006/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006
amending Council Directive 78/660/EEC on the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies
83/349/EEC on Consolidated Accounts, 86/635/EEC on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated
Accounts of Banks and Other Financial Institutions and 91/674/EEC on the Annual Accounts and
Consolidated Accounts of Insurance Undertakings, art. 46a, 2006 O.J. (L 224) 1, 4 (requiring
companies that have securities trading in a market defined by Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC to
provide a corporate governance report).
19
Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative à la représentation équilibrée des femmes et des
hommes au sein des conseils d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité professionnelle [Law
2011-103 of January 27, 2011 for the Equal Representation of Men and Women on Boards of Directors
and Supervisory Boards, and for Professional Equality], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 28, 2011, p. 1680.
20
See Roche, supra note 14; Institut Français des Administrateurs, Journée annuelle des
administrateurs 2010: les nouvelles dynamiques du conseil, 21 ADMINISTRATEUR: LA LETTRE DE L’IFA
1, 3 (2010); Veronique Morali, Les femmes dans les conseils d’administration, in LA GOUVERNANCE
DES ENTREPRISES, CLÉ DE LA COMPÉTIVITÉ 24 n.409 (2011).
21
Institut Français des Administrateurs, supra note 20.
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introduced, nominations from general meetings in 2010 doubled this
percentage: almost a third of new directors were women, and thirty percent
of CAC 4022 companies had reached the FCBQ’s twenty percent
intermediate level.23 In absolute terms, the number of female directors has
risen from 60 to 119 in two years.24 This percentage remains low,
however, for SBF80 companies, where only fifteen percent of directors are
women.25 The spike in the number of women on corporate boards after the
public discussion and eventual adoption of the FCBQ suggests that the
bill’s introduction played a key role in this change. Thus, a certain
correlation may be inferred between the intervention of the legislature and
the recent improvement seen in CAC 40 corporations in terms of gender
equality.26
Studies regarding the profile of female directors in France at the time
of the quota’s adoption show that female directors are generally younger
than their male colleagues (54.7 years old on average compared to 60.7 for
men) and more likely to have international origins.27 That being said, this
profile is shifting as many corporations take on new women directors—
anecdotal evidence confirms this shift.28 Many new female directors hold
degrees in law or business management in contrast to the more technical
education received by their male counterparts. Male directors are most
often graduates of the French Grandes Écoles. Female directors also do
not have the same experience at the top executive levels as male directors.29
One may therefore infer a correlation between the feminization of boards of
directors and some diversification of skills and points of view on how to
run a business. In practical terms, the participation of women on boards of
directors should offer corporations a larger pool of skills and expertise than
a pool composed exclusively of males. A counterargument might assert
that less executive experience may not constitute useful diverse
experience.30 However, given the extraordinarily narrow band of French
22

The CAC 40 is one of the main indices for listed companies, along with the SBF 120 and the
SBF 80.
23
Institut Français des Administrateurs, supra note 20, at 1, 3.
24
Roche, supra note 14.
25
Id. at 24.
26
Id.
27
OBSERVATOIRE DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIÉTALE DES ENTREPRISES, L’ACCES ET LA
REPRESENTATIVITE DES FEMMES AUX ORGANES DE GOUVERNANCE D’ENTREPRISE (Sept. 2009), availabile at
http://www.orse.org/l_acces_et_la_representativite_des_femmes_aux_organes_de_gouvernance_d_entreprise52-8.html.
28
Valérie Lion, Conseils d’administration: ces femmes qui cumulent, L’EXPRESS, May 16, 2012, at
74.
29
Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance
and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 294 (2009).
30
Indeed, one study on the lower experience among women on boards in Norway after their
adoption of a corporate board quota correlates this with lower returns on equity. See generally Kenneth
R. Ahern and Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of
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society that occupies corporate board positions, diversification may bring
new market knowledge.31
2. Was the FCBQ the Right Way to Impose Quotas in
Boardrooms?
Despite these advances, the law has not escaped controversy. Experts
have notably raised three issues. First, the gradual implementation of the
law is not easy to interpret, and the interpretation has raised considerable
debate.32 Second, the sanction of suspending directors’ fees, which is
generally the response to absenteeism or misconduct, is not well suited for
violations of a legal rule on quotas.33 Third, there are concerns that the
aims of the law may not be attainable. Admittedly, the law’s restrictive
requirements may lead to a mechanical application, to the point of adhering
to quotas to the detriment of skills. Indeed, reliable estimates suggest that
the demand for new female directors is close to one thousand.34 The targets
will be even harder to reach if authorities implement a proposal to reduce
the number of concurrently held mandates to less than five.
Furthermore, the violation of the quota, which some anticipate to be
particularly problematic in the case of smaller businesses, and the double
punishment that would follow, raises the fear that it may increase the
liability of directors in the future.35 Although strong feminization of higher
education may facilitate filling these positions over the long term, the
consistent exclusion of women from executive positions will continue to
make it difficult to fill the directorships in the near term. In addition,
reducing the number of concurrently held mandates would logically lead to
greater diversity in the supply of directors. Unless they also come to hold
several directorships,36 the naming of more female directors may well lead
Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q. J. ECON. 137 (2012).
31
Of course, the presumption here is that diversity does lead to value, an assertion that requires
further demonstration. Scott Page’s work on diversity provides substantial material on the productivity
of diversity. See generally SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY
CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007).
32
See generally ASSOCIATION NATIONALE DES SOCIÉTÉS PAR ACTIONS, JOURNÉE D’ÉTUDE DE
L’ANSA (2011).
33
The law establishes two types of sanctions: (1) the nullification of nominations made in violation
of gender equality rules, and (2) for private listed and large companies only, the more original but not
necessarily effective measure of suspending directors’ fees for all directors concerned, where the law
has been violated. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] arts. L225-45, L225-83 (Fr.). For a critique, see
Jean-François Barbiéri, Parité sexuelle obligatoire dans la composition des conseils: le problème des
sanctions, 5 JOLY MENSUAL D’INFORMATION DES SOCIÉTÉS 508, 508 (2010); Chantal Jordan, Vers une
représentation équilibrée dans les conseils d’administration et de surveillance, REVUE LAMY DROIT
DES AFFAIRES, May 2011, at 3462.
34
Morali, supra note 20, at 24.
35
Id.
36
Only two female directors hold at least three directorships concurrently.
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to greater support for a strict rule concerning the concurrent holding of
mandates. Whether or not multiple directorships affect efficacy is an open
question, but it is clear that board-nominating committees prefer candidates
who can focus on their particular corporate context.
B. The Comparative Ease of French Constitutional Modification
French legal culture permitted the FCBQ’s adoption. France permits
the revision of its Constitution through simple legislative approval, unlike
the United States, which requires a legislative supermajority followed by a
supermajority in each of the legislatures of a supermajority of states. The
contrast is marked—the United States Constitution remains a largely 18th
century document,37 while France’s Constitution changes on a regular
basis. The distinct approaches to constitutional reform reflect an equally
profound contrast between the centrality of jurisprudence in common law
jurisdictions and legislation in civil law jurisdictions. Federalism also
plays a role—the relevant jurisdiction for the adoption of such corporate
regulation in the United States would be Delaware, where a majority of the
country’s largest corporations are registered, or in federal securities law.38
The adoption of a CBQ in Delaware would raise both state and federal
constitutional questions with surely unpromising results.39
The most direct precedent for the FCBQ is the passage of Parity in
2000.40 Parity required that political parties name women as half of all
candidates for public office. This occurred as the result of a long
movement for women’s suffrage and electoral equality.41 After a series of
feminist movements related to the right to vote and political
representation,42 a second movement to institute some quotas starting after
the Socialist Party victory of 1981 obtained limited success. However, the
37
A point most eloquently made by Hannah Arendt. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 202
(1963) (“Thus the amendments to the Constitution augment and increase the original foundations of the
American republic.”).
38
Barbara Black, Protecting the Retail Investor in an Age of Financial Uncertainty, 42 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 61, 77–78 (2009).
39
Although France has some regions, the law is uniform throughout the country, and most
European states are not federal.
40
See JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, PARITE!: SEXUAL EQUALITY AND THE CRISIS OF FRENCH
UNIVERSALISM (2005); Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality on the
Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119 (2005).
41
See Rosenblum, supra note 40; SCOTT, supra note 40.
42
Despite ceaseless efforts to attain suffrage, French men represented women in their household for
sixty years after Auclert’s declaration, far longer than in most other democracies. See FRANÇOISE
GASPARD ET AL., AU POUVOIR, CITOYENNES! LIBERTÉ, ÉGALITÉ, PARITÉ! 102 (1992). During the First
World War, one politician proposed unsuccessfully that widows should vote because the men through
whom they were represented could no longer do so. Id. at 103–04. It was only after Vichy’s collapse in
1944 that French women obtained the vote, well after the Nineteenth Amendment’s passage in the
United States. Id. at 21.

259

R&M_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

6/20/14 7:36 PM

34:249 (2014)

Conseil Constitutionnel—the French equivalent to the U.S. Supreme
Court—later struck down the legislation.43 Parity advocates reshaped their
agenda around the notion of a gendered vision of humanity, composed of
two sexes, in order to address these constitutional concerns.44 Confronting
potential victory, Parity advocates began to consider the concerns in the
Conseil Constitutionnel’s 1982 decision, shifting their focus from
guaranteeing legislative seats to requiring parties to guarantee half their
candidacies.45
During the 1990s, Parity advocates built on historical, political, and
philosophical arguments for women’s representation.46 Imposing quotas on
political parties rather than the legislature itself would permit voters to
express their political ideology and increase women’s participation.47
Françoise Gaspard and a broad movement of left-identified feminists
successfully reframed the debate, ultimately allowing Parity to become law
in 2000.48 Additionally, Parity was seen as a cure for a crisis of
43
This version was overturned by the Conseil Constitutionnel in a 1982 ruling. The Conseil
Constitutionnel favors the notion of formal equality over equality of chances with the law. Decision 34,
Feminine Quotas, denied the proposed amendment to modify election rules requiring at least 25% of
the candidates on the list to be women. The Conseil believed that a “text that reserved a certain number
of places for women . . . without doing the same for men . . . would be contrary to the principle of
equality.” Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] décision No. 82-146, Nov. 18, 1982
(Fr.). However, voluntary commitments to women’s representation arose among left-wing political
parties throughout the 1980s. As a strategic move, in 1975 Françoise Giroud, Secretary for Women’s
Condition, introduced 100 measures for women, including a bill limiting the candidates on a list to 80%
for either of the two sexes. Original language reserved 20% for women, but this language was removed
at the advice of attorneys concerned about such a quota. Four years later, the Minister for Family and
Women’s Conditions proposed a 20% minimum for towns with populations above 2,500. GILL
ALLWOOD & KHURSHEED WADIA, WOMEN AND POLITICS IN FRANCE 1958-2000 192 (2000); GASPARD
ET AL., supra note 42, at 136–37. Although the Assembly approved the bill, the session ended before
the Senate could debate it.
44
See Rosenblum, supra note 40; SCOTT, supra note 40.
45
See Rosenblum, supra note 40.
46
Parity advocates claimed that women were being subjected to the rule of men: “The monopolization of
power by a group, by a clique, as well as by a sex is a usurpation.” GASPARD ET AL., supra note 42, at 181.
Another important point was Mariette Sineau’s critique of France’s “Monosexual Democracy.” The
“maleness” of the political class, Parity advocates argued, constituted a “monosexual” democracy in which
men acquire political power early in their lives, often based on social position and family. See MARIETTE
SINEAU, PROFESSION FEMME POLITIQUE: SEXE ET POUVOIR SOUS LA CINQUIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE 240 (2001).
47
ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 43, at 211.
48
GASPARD ET AL., supra note 42. In the early 1990s, Parity began to gain momentum. See
Isabelle Giraud & Jane Jenson, Constitutionalizing Equal Access: High Hopes, Dashed Hopes?, in HAS
LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES 73 (Sytte Klausen & Charles S. Maier eds., 2001). In March 1992, a roundtable meeting was
organized to serve as a “network for Parity.” CLAUDE DE GRANRUT, ALLEZ LES FEMMES!: LA PARITÉ
EN POLITIQUE 34 (2002). Months later, in Au Pouvoir, Citoyennes! (To Power, Women Citizens!),
Françoise Gaspard argued that the Revolution, the suffrage movement, and the postwar period all failed
to address the issue of outcome-based women’s participation in elected bodies. See GASPARD ET AL.,
supra note 42. Le Monde’s publication of the “Manifesto of 577 for Paritary Democracy” placed Parity
on the national stage, winning the endorsement of the left and the continued inattention of the right,
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democracy—a method to legitimize the state.49 The final version of the
law amended the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of 1958 and provided
for legislation that would implement the constitutional changes.50 Parity’s
implementation has been met with marked success in some elections and
more modest advances in others. It continues to be the subject of much
debate.51
Like Parity, the FCBQ was initially deemed unconstitutional, and the
constitutional prohibition was overcome by legislative action. In both
cases, the objective of sex equality played a central role. It is worth noting,
however, that the FCBQ originated from a conservative government,
whereas Parity arose out of a progressive bloc. This fact proves surprising
for those who view the measure as a feminist move. It is a view rarely
taken by political conservatives. However, the utilitarian business
justification of the law reflects its conservative origins.
The constitutional framework in France allowed for a constitutional
legitimacy for mixité, or the inclusion of people of both sexes. Preceding
the publication of the FCBQ, many scholars debated constitutional issues
and some argued that a law introducing quotas was prohibited because the
constitutional principle of Republican equality prohibits positive
discrimination.52 In addition, under French traditional jurisprudence, the
prohibition of quotas was specifically applied to private companies. The
Conseil Constitutionnel decided that “the Constitution does not allow that

apart from Simone Veil. Legislators proposed a version of progressive but non-mandatory Parity.
Leading male politicians came out in favor of Parity, including two candidates in the 1995 Presidential
race. See generally ÉLÉONORE LÉPINARD, L’ÉGALITÉ INTROUVABLE: LA PARITÉ, LES FÉMINISTES ET LA
RÉPUBLIQUE (2007).
49
Rosenblum, supra note 40; ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 43, at 213 (“The main indicators of
this crisis included the growing gap between the concerns of the French people and the political elite,
repeatedly demonstrated by public opinion polls; rising abstention rates; the failure of the parties to
recruit new members; and public disaffection with a political class in which scandals seemed
endemic.”); SINEAU, supra note 46, at 246 (“The debate on Parity only served to restart the question of
the renewal of democracy by women.”).
50
The constitutional revision took place in 1999. Law Number 99–569 of July 8, 1999 modified
Articles 1 through 4 of the Constitution of October 4, 1958. Title I of Law Number 2000–493 of June
6, 2000 basically requires that in France’s semi-proportional system, municipal, regional, European, and
some senatorial elections use party slates, while others, notably National Assembly elections, require
voters to select a particular candidate. In a list-proportional election, instituting Parity appeared
relatively simple—every other name had to correspond to the “other” sex. Should a party fail to present
candidates of alternating gender, the prefecture would refuse to present the list on the ballot. Parties
were required to name women to half their candidacies or lose the ability to field any candidates at all.
See generally LÉPINARD, supra note 48.
51
For an authoritative discussion of Parity, see LÉPINARD, supra note 48. It is worthwhile to
contrast this work with one executed at the time of Parity’s passage. See JANINE MOSSUZ-LAVAU,
Femmes et pouvoir en Europe méridionale en l’an 2000, in RAPPORT NATIONAL FRANÇAIS 43 (2000)
(noting elections by list where three or fewer candidates appear to also avoid Parity rules).
52
Anne-Marie Le Pourhiet, Pour une analyse critique de la discrimination positive, 114 LE DÉBAT
166 (2001).
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the composition of directory or supervisory boards in private and public
companies should be regulated by strict rules based on sex quotas.”53 This
decision was interpreted as rejecting quotas as a whole and, specifically, on
boards of directors. Accordingly, the Constitution had to be amended
before the FCBQ was passed. The amendment, Law 2008-724 of July 23,
2008, modified Article 1 of the French Constitution.54 According to the
new constitutional rule, “the law favors the equal access to elective
mandates and positions for women and men, as well as to professional and
social responsibilities.”55 Thus, the new constitutional law made quotas
possible in two main sectors: politics and management. Amending the
Constitution to accommodate corporate board quotas highlights the relative
fluidity of the French Constitution.
C. U.S. Constitutional Jurisprudence Has Rejected Quotas
While French constitutional law now permits a focus on mixité, thus
far it rejects any recognition of broader diversity in legal remedies for
inequality. Beyond the common law–civil law divide, quotas underscore a
particularly interesting contrast between the French and U.S. constitutional
frameworks. In the United States, courts have consistently rejected quotas,
as have thinkers across the ideological spectrum.56 Even supporters of
affirmative action have distinguished incremental affirmative action
programs from quotas, which have been characterized as malignant,
unjustifiable, and inherently wrong.57 Although affirmative action may be
called a quota in other contexts, quotas, at least those labeled as such, are
pariahs.
1. Quotas Examined Through the U.S. Constitutional Process
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected quotas, even as it has affirmed
the appropriate inclusion of discrete remedies for past discrimination. U.S.
jurisprudence has rejected quotas specifically with regard to race-related
affirmative action in higher education. The seminal case, Regents of the
53
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2006-533DC, Mar. 16, 2006,
Rec. 39 (Fr.). See also Julie Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to
Corporate Boards, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 449 (2012).
54
Loi 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des institutions de la Ve République (1) [Law
2008-724 of July 23, 2008 on the Modernization of the Institutions of the Fifth Republic (1)], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 23, 2008, p.
11890.
55
Id.
56
See Rosenblum, supra note 40, at 1133–36.
57
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Symposium on Race Consciousness and Legal Scholarship: Defending the
Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1067
(1992).
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University of California v. Bakke, differentiated affirmative action (which it
held was permissible within specific confines) from a quota, which it ruled
was impermissible.58 In considering the legitimacy of a remedy, the U.S.
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny as it had in previous race cases. To
survive this highest level of scrutiny, the law in question must involve a
compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. Laws or regulations involving gender are examined under the
lower, intermediate scrutiny standard. In Bakke, the Court considered a
challenge to the University of California’s special-admission program that
reserved 16 out of 100 placements for minority students.59 The Court
found that the goal of assuring specified numerical representation of a
specific group was facially invalid as a form of race discrimination.60 It
held that race can be a factor in making determinations but cannot be the
sole factor in excluding a certain group.61
This same reasoning would apply in the gender context. Were a
jurisdiction in the United States to adopt a law similar to the FCBQ, it
would undoubtedly run afoul of the very principles articulated in Bakke that
have remained controlling in subsequent affirmative action cases. In
particular, like Bakke, a CBQ reserves spots for a specific group—it does
not make gender one factor among many, but rather makes gender the only
qualifying trait for compliance with the quota. If a federal court were to
analyze a statute such as the CBQ, it would follow the intermediate
scrutiny standard in which classifications must further a substantial
governmental interest and be tailored to fit that interest. The court could
not “rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females.”62 As in Bakke, gender
could be a factor among several in developing programs to benefit women,
but a numerical quota that can be filled only by women would be
prohibited. Subsequent case law has only further limited the application of
affirmative action authorized in Bakke.63 Advocates for such a quota would
have to articulate the state interest in workplace diversity, but even under
this standard, it would only apply to state-funded organizations. The

58

See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Donald T. Kramer, Annotation, What Constitutes Reverse Sex or Gender Discrimination Against
Males Violative of Federal Constitution or Statutes—Nonemployment Cases, 166 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2000).
63
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying a strict scrutiny standard to decide
whether the consideration of an applicant’s race as part of the University of Michigan Law School’s
admissions process was constitutionally permissible and holding that consideration of race in the
admission process is constitutional so long as it is used as one factor among many in an individualized
process); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (utilizing the strict scrutiny standard, the
Court disallowed the University of Michigan’s admissions policy in allotting points in the admission
process to minorities on the sole basis of their minority classification).
59
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alternative would be that such a quota would redress past discrimination,
but the evidence would have to be extremely persuasive.
One of the most prominent ways in which the United States has
addressed gender inequality is through Title IX, which prohibits sex
discrimination in the education context.64 Title IX requires institutions to
ensure that university sports funding is substantially proportionate to the
respective enrollments of male and female students. If one sex has been
underrepresented, the program should effectively include the
underrepresented sex. Although the U.S. Congress clearly did not intend
Title IX to be a quota, closer examination of Title IX’s provisions reveals
its quota-like aspects, as it compares opportunities by gender and only
allows limited disparities. Like the FCBQ and Parity, Title IX achieves
adjustments in gender inequality with wide-ranging effects.
Despite Title IX’s quota-like enforcement method, quota-phobia
dominated the debate surrounding it. One sponsor asserted that, “we are
striking down quotas. The thrust . . . is to do away with every quota.”65 As
one critic alleged, “[A] system that requires a certain number of persons to
be granted an opportunity based solely on one characteristic—such as
sex—without regard for other qualifications—such as ability—is a ‘quota
system’ in every sense of the words.”66 This antipathy towards quotas
continues today, as it mirrors the fundamental reluctance to grapple with
structural power differentials and group rights. Title IX’s mechanism
extended benefits based on the gender ratio of the student body, rather than
64
The statute states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). A relevant
comparison to Title IX is Norway’s CBQ and the French Parity law. See generally Darren Rosenblum,
Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based Inequality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873
(2008). In contrast to both the CBQ and Parity, Title IX relies on the entirely distinct methodology of
requiring substantial proportionality to reduce or eliminate gender-related harm in education. Congress
passed Title IX in 1972 to extend the protections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to federally funded
educational institutions on the basis of sex. The statute states that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). Title IX’s first compliance option requires substantially proportionate
opportunities, a standard that functions much like a quota. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed the validity of the substantial proportionality test in Cohen v. Brown University, 991
F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993). Despite subsequent limitations, critics allege that substantial proportionality
remains the only possible compliance option for many institutions. Title IX’s proportionality
requirement reflects an underlying redistributive response to gender inequality: the use of a quota
system.
65
Donald Mahoney, Taking a Shot at the Tile: A Critical Review of Judicial and Administrative
Interpretations of Title IX as Applied to Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 27 CONN. L. REV. 943, 946
(1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 30,409 (1971)).
66
Id. at 944. Senator Daryl Beall noted that a gender quota could result in reverse discrimination
against others: “As we eliminate [sex discrimination in education], I hope that we are not establishing
still another form of bias.” Id. at 948 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 5813 (1972)).
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that of the broader national population, in a way that seems designed to
avoid appearances of a quota. At the time Title IX was passed, the
majority of students were men,67 and Congress’s remedy aided women, but
only in relation to their student body population.68
In addition, quotas arouse disdain from the political-right and
political-left. A laissez-faire framework would view quotas as an intrusion
into the private sector and a subversion of private interests.69 One
economic analysis, that of Gary Becker, would likely assert that, if it were
more efficient to have women on boards, absent market failure, competitive
corporations would already include them.70 Liberal rejection of quotas may
focus on several arguments, including that quotas violate the neutrality of
constitutional doctrine,71 according to which a benefit to a particular group
would inappropriately disfavor others. Notably, “Classical democratic
liberal theory was preoccupied enough with issues of extending equality
that it rarely discussed difference.”72 The presumption is that, as a
fundamental matter, no group should be treated any better than another
group. The normative question is whether one group should benefit and

67
See Richard W. Riley, Introduction, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (June 10, 1997), http://www2.ed.gov/
pubs/TitleIX/part1.html; see also Iram Valentin, Title IX: A Brief History, 2 HOLY CROSS J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 123, 130 (1997).
68
See Rosenblum, supra note 64, at 2883.
69
Here, we presume what a law and economics scholar would find, given that there are no direct
commentaries as of yet on corporate board quotas. The three central precepts of law and economics
theory are rational choice, wealth maximization or efficiency, and faith in markets. Anita Bernstein,
Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303, 308–15 (2005). Richard Posner
declares that a “man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (6th ed. 2003). Furthermore, “The only kind of preference that counts in a system
of wealth maximization is thus one that is backed up by money⎯in other words, that is registered in a
market.” Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119
(1979). Thus, it is the existence of a market that creates a venue to make efficiency or wealth
maximization possible. Accordingly, for the law and economics traditionalist, gender quotas would
undermine the market, the system of wealth maximization, and the framework by which men rationally
maximize their own interests in life.
70
See generally GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
71
Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography,
Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992). “Neutrality,” as predominantly defined, is
believed to be of natural origin and therefore just. Id. Sunstein, however, finds this “baseline” belief
incorrect because the notion of what is neutral is instead a culmination of old biases and stereotypes.
Id. at 3–4. The notion of “equality” cannot be detached from references to old values and distributions
because the concept is dependent upon how the government normally ensures “equality” rather than
how it should be accomplished. Id. at 6–9. Sunstein argues that the baseline for determining what is
neutral arises from what is considered “natural,” and what is natural originates in what the government
normally does. In order to make change, the baseline of neutrality, in a constitutional context, must be
adjusted through a substantive debate that is not reliant upon what is considered “natural.” Id. at 13.
72
Charles S. Maier & Sytte Klausen, Introduction, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING
EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 3, 5, 19 (Sytte Klausen & Charles S.
Maier eds., 2001).
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whether such a benefit would necessarily disadvantage other groups.73
Even if a nation determines that a particular group should benefit, how it
makes this determination involves a different question. Another liberal
concern is that ideas, rather than identity, should determine representation,
reflecting “a general reluctance to mandate equality (or proportionality) of
outcomes rather than alleged equality of opportunity.”74
Liberal and critical thinkers usually clash on a wide range of issues.75
However, critical thinkers agree with liberals in rejecting quotas. They
argue that no such thing as neutrality exists. Quotas further essentialist
notions of identity, as there is an assumption that women are better
equipped to represent women and that black representatives better represent
black people.76 Thus, critical theorists reject quotas because they foster
essentialist notions of identity. Feminist theorists also reject essentialist
arguments that imply “that any woman may represent women generally,
regardless of social differences.”77 Anti-essentialist feminism holds that no
essential notion of ‘womanhood’ exists.78 In short, no substantial legal
academic movement has arisen to support or defend the legitimacy of
quotas in any regard.
Simply stated, U.S. jurisprudence and commentary roundly reject
quotas as an unconstitutional violation of the most basic American social
tenets. Even as the United States permits affirmative action in racial
contexts, arousing French disdain for “communitarianism,” it rejects quotas
in race and gender contexts.79 France, in contrast, directly authorizes
quotas in the gender context. However, under its policy of laïcité, France
refuses to even permit the public collection of data about racial, ethnic, and
73
This argument arose in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), in which white voters sued to
overturn a majority-minority district.
74
Maier & Klausen, supra note 72, at 4.
75
For example, the central assumption of critical race theorists is “that American society and its
institutions, including its legal institutions, are fundamentally racist, and that racism is not a deviation
from the normal operation of American society.” Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed
Structure and Application to Federal Pleading, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 2, 3 (Dorothy A. Brown ed., 2003).
76
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral
Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1102–03 (1991) (“Authentic black representation, or ‘descriptive’
representation, is the first important building block for black electoral success theory. Authenticity refers to
community-based and culturally rooted leadership. The concept also distinguishes between minoritysponsored and white-sponsored black candidates. Basically, authentic representation describes the
psychological value of black representation. The term is suggestive of the essentialist impulse in black
political participation: because black officials are black, they are representative. Thus, authenticity reflects the
importance of race in defining the character of black political participation.”).
77
Jane Mansbridge, The Descriptive Political Representation of Gender: An Anti-Essentialist
Argument, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 72, at 19.
78
See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
149 (1999).
79
Rosenblum, supra note 64.
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religious minorities.80 The flexibility in the French constitutional structure
permits experimentation and shifting in perspectives on questions such as
quotas. Although clearly in violation of basic principles of equality
enshrined in the French Constitution and in French history, the facilitating
amendments of both Parity and the FCBQ illustrate the malleability of
French equality traditions and the judiciary’s subordination to the
legislature.
The FCBQ stands as an example of the vast legal cultural difference
between the United States and France surrounding the treatment of
difference and remedies to combat discrimination.
Although the
constitutional framework of the two countries provokes compelling
debates, the next part of this Article examines their impact on corporate
governance—in particular, the debate over whether corporations should be
governed for the benefit of shareholders or stakeholders.
III. GOVERNANCE: STAKEHOLDERS OR SHAREHOLDERS
France has an extensive history of public participation in private
corporate governance, while U.S. law enshrines principles of freedom of
contract and property. Recently, this distinction has been emphasized in
the debate over shareholder and stakeholder primacy. Under shareholder
primacy, the corporation’s goal is to benefit shareholders.81 This system,
which has strengthened over the past few decades,82 has reached its apogee
in the United States as regulators and companies adopt provisions to give
shareholders a “say” on everything from corporate policy to executive
compensation. In contrast, a stakeholder focus recognizes that shareholders,
as simply the owners of a corporation’s residual interests, are but one of
many entities the corporation exists to serve, and none of these interests is
primary. From a contractual standpoint, the rights of bondholders and
other creditors come before that of shareholders. Conversely, stakeholder
governance reflects the complex link between corporate decision-making
and broader societal welfare, including workers, customers, communities,
and even governments.83
The stakeholder/shareholder debate falls along the lines of a clear and
80

Rosenblum, supra note 40.
See generally Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002).
82
See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON
HALL L. REV. 909, 915–16 (2013) (noting that U.S. corporate governance “from the 1930s to the
1970s . . . was characterized by what is often called ‘managerial capitalism’”). For an example of
“managerial capitalism” during this time period, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (discussing that under this theory, the
board of directors balances interests of various stakeholders).
83
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 8–9 (2001).
81

267

R&M_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

6/20/14 7:36 PM

34:249 (2014)

central geographic divide. While corporate governance in the United States
rests on shareholder primacy, stakeholder governance is much more
commonplace in Europe; it is even part of the regulatory scheme in many
countries.84 For example, several European countries require union
representation on the board of directors.85 This part of the Article
articulates the distinction between shareholder and stakeholder visions, and
demonstrates how this phenomenon exposes a transatlantic disharmony.
According to stakeholder theory, a corporation’s primary purpose is to
pursue strategies that advance the interests of stakeholders, which include
groups and individuals affected by the corporation.86
Whereas a
shareholder firm has improving investment returns for shareholders as its
central goal, a stakeholder firm takes into account the multiple objectives
involved with the various interests who have a “stake” in the corporation’s
endeavors.87 Examples of stakeholders include workers, customers,
communities where the corporation is located, and even governments for
those same communities.88 Stakeholder theory may reflect underlying
84

Franklin Allen et al., Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value (Eur.
Corp. Gov’t Inst., Working Paper No. 190, 2009) (analyzing how legal frameworks ensure stakeholder
orientation and how this focus affects competition).
85
See L. Fulton, Worker Representation in Europe, ETUI, http://www.worker-participation.eu/
National-Industrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Board-level-Representation2 (last visited May 11, 2014).
86
R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., COMPANY STAKEHOLDER RESPONSIBILITY: A NEW APPROACH TO
CSR 10 (2005) The authors find that CSR has outlived its usefulness because it promotes the
separation theses—the idea that business issues and social issues can be dealt with separately—and
focuses on corporations. They also contend that CSR should be replaced with “company stakeholder
responsibility,” which takes into consideration the intertwined nature of economic, political, social, and
ethical issues. See also Sylvia Ayuso et al., Maximizing Stakeholders’ Interests: An Empirical Analysis
of the Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Governance (U. of Navarra, IESE Bus. Sch., Working Paper
No. 670, 2007). The authors analyze function at board level, board diversity, and stakeholder
engagement. They frame their discussion on a stakeholder model of corporate governance within the
perspective of the sustainable and responsible firm whose economic survival depends on its ability to
satisfy the needs of its various stakeholders. They conclude that there is evidence that CSR
responsibility on the board is positively associated with indicators for dealing with primary and
secondary stakeholders but not with a more diverse representation on the board. However, board
diversity had a positive impact on firm profitability, similar to stakeholder engagement. See also Silvia
Ayuso & Antonio Argandoña, Responsible Corporate Governance: Towards a Stakeholder Board of
Directors?, 6 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 9 (2009). Ayuso and Argandoña analyze the arguments
given by different theoretical approaches for linking specific board composition with financial
performance and CSR, and discuss the empirical research conducted. Despite inconclusive findings,
they argue that diverse stakeholders on the board will promote CSR activities of the firm, but it will also
increase board capital—which could ultimately lead to better financial performance.
87
Gerard Charreaux, Corporate Governance: Stakeholder Value Versus Shareholder Value, 5 J.
MGMT. GOV’T 107 (2001) (“Unsatisfied with the dominating shareholders’ point of view . . . we
propose an enlarged definition of the value which may be called the stakeholder value.”).
88
See generally Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). General
Motors sought tax relief from the town of Ypsilanti in order to make improvements at its Willow Run factory.
At a public hearing the plant manager Williams stated that “upon completion of this project and favorable
market demand, it will allow Willow Run to continue production and maintain continuous employment for our
employees.” Id. at 561. General Motors later decided to move its production to another region of the country
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ethical norms, but it might also be to the corporation’s ultimate financial
benefit.89 It may even link to some developments in corporate social
responsibility (CSR), also known as socially responsible investing (SRI) in
Europe.90
When evaluating corporate management, it becomes clear that
strategies have direct consequences on stakeholders.91 Managing a
corporation with stakeholders in mind requires executives to “formulate
and implement processes which satisfy all and only those groups who have
and Ypsilanti sued for an injunction. The court held that GM was not liable under the theory of promissory
estoppel because the fact that a corporation solicits tax abatements and persuades a municipality to grant them
with assurances of jobs is not evidence of a promise.
89
Some argue that a stakeholder focus is not necessarily solely an ethical issue. In particular, one
might argue that the firm can maximize its wealth through a focus on the variety of a firm’s
engagements, including human capital. See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder
Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance,
50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 136, 152 (2009) (reasoning that a commitment to stakeholders has an
economic purpose rather than reflecting ethical norms). Professor Gelter also suggests that although
U.S. corporate governance follows a model that is closer to the team production theory asserted by Blair
and Stout, continental Europe has more formal legal mechanisms such as codetermination and proemployee labor law. Id. at 142, 148–54, 155–68. See also Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose
in the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 585, 639–41 (2010) (noting that U.K.
corporate governance, as compared to U.S. corporate governance, has more of a focus on shareholder
interest because, in the takeover context, health care is not linked to employment status).
90
Elaine Sternberg, for example, argues that stakeholder theory, while it reflects some ethical
considerations, does not go far enough. See generally Elaine Sternberg, The Stakeholder Concept: A
Mistaken Doctrine, 4 FOUND. BUS. RESP. (1999). Sternberg argues that a stakeholder theory that asserts
organizations must be held accountable to their stakeholders is misguided and incapable of providing
better corporate governance, business performance, or business conduct. She argues that a better model
of business ethics and social responsibility is the author’s Ethical Decision Model. Social responsibility
is not a responsibility to stakeholders, but a responsibility of stakeholders. It consists of the strategic
bestowal or withholding of support for social and economic institutions on the basis of stakeholder
values. Id. For a discussion of the relationship between stakeholder firms and CSR, see Lorenzo
Sacconi, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a Model of “Extended” Corporate Governance: An
Explanation Based on the Economic Theories of Social Contract, Reputation and Reciprocal
Conformism, 142 LIUC PAPERS IN LAW, ETHICS & ECON. 1 (2005) (Corporate social responsibility can
be defined as a form of governance that extends the concept of fiduciary duty from a mono-stakeholder
setting—where the relevant stakeholder is the owner—to one where the firm owes fiduciary duties to all
its stakeholders—the owners included. For CSR to be widely accepted and successful, it needs a body
that promotes social dialogue that creates broad consensus on standards and promotes independent
verification of compliance with these standards. It also needs a body that will disseminate necessary
information to the public and stakeholders so they can make informed decisions about which
organizations to support. These multi-stakeholder bodies would be made up of business associations—
for-profit, cooperatives, and non-profit—and representatives of principal stakeholders—trade unions,
consumers, environmental associations, local authorities, etc.). For additional discussion of CSR and
stakeholder theory, see Leonardo Becchetti et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder’s
Value: An Empirical Analysis (Bank of Fin. Research, Discussion Paper 1, 2009) (investigating the
impact and relevance of CSR to the capital market and tracing market reactions to corporate entry into
and exit from the Domini 400 Social Index—a recognized CSR benchmark).
91
See generally R. Edward Freeman & John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic
Management (Darden Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 01-02, 2001).
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a stake in the business. The central task in this process is to manage and
integrate the relationships and interests of shareholders, employees,
customers, suppliers, communities and other groups in a way that ensures
the long-term success of the firm.”92 Shareholder firms, in contrast, focus
on “value maximization”—investment gain for shareholders, who may be
focused on short-term gains.93
As persuasive as stakeholder theory may appear, several critics
question whether its fuzzy definition of corporate purpose is a disservice,
not only to shareholders, but also to the corporation’s other constituents.
Stakeholder theory, for critics, “directs corporate managers to serve ‘many
masters’”94 and supports “special interest groups who wish to . . . enhance
their influence over the allocation of corporate resources.”95 Rather,
corporate success depends on clear goals for value—something critics
argue is precluded by a stakeholder orientation.96
A. United States’ Shareholder Primacy
Corporate governance in the United States consistently emphasizes the
state’s limited role in regulating private property and private contracts.
These “private” economic structures dominate U.S. corporate law and
support a notion of shareholder primacy (in contrast to stakeholder
governance) that fits into this regulatory regime. The United States’
corporate governance strongly emphasizes the limited role government can
and should play in regulating the “private” sector. Descended from the
British system of private property and liberty to contract,97 the United
States’ legal framework allows private parties near complete dominion over
their property. The permissive regime governing property in the United
States is supported by the paucity of restrictions in many areas, including
zoning,98 eminent domain,99 and the land-marking of significant
92

Id. at 8.
Jensen, supra note 83, at 8–9. But see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 1 (“There is no
longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase longterm shareholder value.”).
94
Jensen, supra note 83, at 9.
95
Id. at 15 n.17.
96
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 4–5 (“The collapse of the conglomerate movement in
the 1970s and 1980s, however, largely destroyed the normative appeal of the managerialist model. It is
now the conventional wisdom that, when managers are given great discretion over corporate investment
policies, they mostly end up serving themselves, however well-intentioned they may be. While
managerial firms may be in some ways more efficiently responsive to nonshareholder interests than are
firms that are more dedicated to serving their shareholders, the price paid in inefficiency of operations
and excessive investment in low-value projects is now considered too dear.”).
97
NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH WORLD ORDER AND THE
LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POWER (2003).
98
See Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
99
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
93
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buildings.100 The regulation of contract law follows an equally liberal
model of limited state involvement, in which individuals are presumed to
be rational actors empowered to enter into arms-length contracts. The
corporation’s interest, in U.S. corporate governance, is singular in focus
and easy to identify: the shareholders.101 This overall framework grants
extraordinary deference to the corporate entity, in sharp contrast to the
corporatist tradition in Europe that accords the state a far greater role in
managing the corporate sector both generally and with regard to specific
corporations.102
The United States’ corporate governance discourse has identified the
shareholder/stakeholder primacy debate as central. Shareholder primacy
regards the corporation as a vehicle for maximizing the shareholders’
interests, primarily profits. Boards, directors, and managers of corporations
dictated by shareholder primacy focus on increasing investment returns for
shareholders.103 Their bonuses often depend on this performance, and they
structure mid- and lower-level workers’ goals around increasing returns for
investors.
1. The Predominance of Agency Theory
Two iterations of early twentieth century corporate governance
demonstrate the historic centrality of shareholder primacy. First, Adolf
Berle, the authority on modern corporate governance, played a large role in
establishing the legitimacy of shareholder primacy. His concern, at the end
of the 1920s, was the increasingly centralized nature of corporate power,
which he and his collaborator Gardiner Means projected would continue

100

See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 10 (“Of course, asserting the primacy of shareholder
interests in corporate law does not imply that the interests of corporate stakeholders must or should go
unprotected. It merely indicates that the most efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting the interests
of nonshareholder constituencies—or at least all constituencies other than creditors—lie outside of
corporate law. For workers, this includes the law of labor contracting, pension law, health and safety
law, and antidiscrimination law. For consumers, it includes product safety regulation, warranty law,
tort law governing product liability, antitrust law, and mandatory disclosure of product contents and
characteristics. For the public at large, it includes environmental law and the law of nuisance and mass
torts.”). One might even say that the business judgment rule’s deferential standard favors shareholder
interests. In the corporate governance context, the business judgment rule typifies the high level of
deference courts extend to corporations and their boards in making determinations about the
corporation’s behavior. This standard requires board members to perform their duties in good faith,
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances, and in a manner the director(s) reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The presumption is that, “in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Id.
102
For a discussion of corporatist policies in France, see Suk, supra note 53.
103
Ayuso & Argandoña, supra note 86, at 9–10.
101
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and transform the economy within decades.104 Berle and Means’s founding
text, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, was based on the
observation that the increasing liquidity of the U.S. financial markets had
brought about a separation between capital ownership and management,
concentrating excessive power in the hands of managers.105
This
precipitated the reaction of re-balancing power in favor of shareholders and
placing greater limits on managers to force them to prioritize the interests
of the corporation over their own selfish interests.106 These premises are
based on the economic model of agency theory, which was first developed
by Michael Jensen and William Meckling,107 and led to the affirmation of
the superior power of shareholders.
As the Great Depression commenced, Berle worked with candidate
and later President Franklin D. Roosevelt to enunciate a formulation of
economic policy and corporate regulation that included shareholder
primacy, enforced by the courts, as a key mechanism for remedying the
excesses of the 1920s. Through Berle’s articulation of shareholder
primacy, a broad and diverse population of shareholders could control
corporate managers, thereby mitigating the increasing concentration of
economic power.108
Second, the classic American case, Dodge v. Ford, which predated
Berle’s work by a decade, raised this very question, although not in these
exact terms.109 In that case, the Dodge brothers, owners of Dodge Motor

104

William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The
Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849 (2010); see also William W. Bratton
& Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern
Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008).
105
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. ed., 1968); Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers
are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
106
Antoine Rebérioux, Gouvernance d’entreprise et contrôle des dirigeants: 1932–2008, d’une
crise à l’autre, in LES GOUVERNANCES DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES FACE À LA CRISE: POUR UNE MEILLEURE
PROTECTION DE L’INTÉRÊT SOCIAL 5–6 (L.G.D.J. ed., 2010).
107
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
108
At the time, Means’s projections sent a clear message: something had to be done about corporate
power, something more than Berle had thought previously. Berle changed his views accordingly. What
he formerly saw as a governance problem to be treated contractually within the financial community
now came to be seen as a case for judicial control in the name of the shareholder interest. See sources
cited supra note 105.
109
Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). This case is widely recognized as an endorsement
of shareholder primacy. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 549 (2003) (“Dodge’s theory of shareholder wealth
maximization has been widely accepted by courts over an extended period of time.”); Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 739 (2005); Ian B. Lee,
Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 535–36
(2006) (“Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. remains the high-water mark for shareholder primacy.”).
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Company, then a competitor to Ford Motor Company, owned a ten percent
stake in Ford.110 Ford’s profits were extraordinary after the development of
the assembly line, and the vision of its president was similarly grandiose.
Henry Ford declared, “My ambition . . . is to employ still more men; to
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number,
to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this, we are
putting the greatest share of our profits back into the business.”111 The
Dodges sought to force Ford to issue a dividend to shareholders, an action
Ford strongly resisted, claiming a cautious preference for maintaining
substantial cash balances in case of emergency.112 Ford lost on the
dividend issue, as the Dodge Court held that the corporation exists
primarily for the shareholders’ benefit.113 Although the law has since
shifted in favor of giving greater deference to management’s choices
regarding the dispensation of profits, the principal of shareholder primacy
remains a core value of corporate governance theory.
2. The Paradox of Agency Theory
In a literal sense, shareholder primacy is a misnomer: shareholders
may be first in priority of duty owed, but they are last in right. The
shareholder’s legal right over the corporation is not that of an owner—
rather the shareholder “owns” a residual interest in the corporation’s
profits. This interest is last in right because all other creditors have the
right to recover funds prior to the shareholder receiving any part of any
profits. Moreover, bondholders, and any other party with whom the
corporation has contractual privity, step ahead of shareholders in claims
against the corporation.
Since shareholders’ interests are residual,
corporate governance norms place shareholders in the position of power
both as the parties who elect the board of directors, and as the central
beneficiaries of corporate success. Even the most ardent advocate of
shareholder primacy would never challenge the actual primacy of
bondholders.114 Resistance to shareholder primacy, in addition to the
110

Dodge, 170 N.W. at 670–71.
Id. at 671.
112
Id. at 676–77.
113
Id. It is worth noting, however, that some object to this case’s celebrity. See, e.g., Lynn A.
Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008).
114
Stout, supra note 81, at 1190 (“[W]e have made at least some intellectual progress over the
intervening decades on the question of the proper role of the corporation. In particular we have learned
that some of the most frequently raised arguments for shareholder primacy are, not to put too fine a
point on it, bad arguments. By ‘bad’ arguments, I do not mean arguments that are somehow morally
offensive or normatively unattractive. Rather, I mean arguments that are, as a positive matter,
inaccurate, incorrect, and unpersuasive to the careful and neutral observer.”). It is worth noting that the
growing importance of intangible assets is reshaping the basic conditions of corporate governance: “The
aim is twofold: i) to explain logically why intangible assets modifies the allocation of residual claims,
as company performance can substantially affect the wealth of other stakeholders ii) to determine which
111
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increasingly growing support for CSR, created the space for stakeholder
theory.
In recent years, even during the current financial crisis, shareholder
primacy has only gained traction. One important provision in the DoddFrank legislation authorizes shareholders to have nonbinding votes to
approve executive pay.115 These “say on pay” rules do not significantly
increase actual shareholder power, but they do convey that the
empowerment of shareholders may serve as a brake on excessive corporate
behavior.116
In short, although stakeholder theory in the United States has become
fairly elaborate, it remains a largely theoretical endeavor as shareholder
theory continues to hold the preeminent place in practical corporate
governance.
B. France’s Stakeholder Primacy
The shareholder structure in many European Union states differs from
that of the Unites States, even for large firms. In Germany, France, and
other European nations, ownership has historically been much more
concentrated as banks, families, the state, and, most importantly, other nonfinancial corporations comprise the majority of large shareholders. These
ownership patterns could lead to the assumption that the separation of
ownership and control is prima facie irrelevant. This assumption is not
entirely true—the separation of ownership from control can occur through
different means117—but many European countries progressively adopted a
more stakeholder-oriented approach as skepticism about capitalism rose,
constituencies should be considered as relevant stakeholders and contribute, to some extent, to the
corporate governance.” Arturo Capasso, Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Governance: The Role of
Intangible Assets 2 (European Corp. Gov’t Inst., Working Paper, 2004) (“Company law says that
shareholders own the assets and the free cash flows, but this only works on the basis of a primitive view
of the nature of ownership and employment. The crucial intangible assets could be, in many cases, out
of the direct control of either shareholders or management. They are, in fact, shared in common
between the firm and some of its stakeholders, like employees, customers, suppliers. In order to build
and enhance its intangible endowment a firm has to establish and consolidate a trustworthy fiduciary
relationship between the firm and these stakeholders.”).
115
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
§ 951(a)(1) (2010).
116
See Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119 (2010).
117
A corporation with concentrated ownership can come within the managerial category due to the
identity of its large shareholders, if the latter are not interested in controlling managers. For instance,
“cross-shareholding networks in Germany have this very effect since they are used as a shield against
control oriented shareholders’ influence.” ALAN DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE GLOBALIZATION
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7 (2009). In France, where families are very present in large companies,
the scale of operations often demands the delegation of control to a large managerial hierarchy.
Moreover, concentrated ownership does not mean majority. What was called the “noyaux durs” in the
1980s in France meant that the new privatized corporation was still kept by a concentrated ownership,
but was too small to have a majority for important decisions like takeovers or big strategic changes.
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core governance shortcomings were revealed, and the concomitant need for
reform in the EU became clear in the wake of hard financial times.118
1. Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance
The preceding section reviewed corporate governance debates in
terms of shareholder values. Whereas economists once asserted, on the
grounds that price reflects the scarcity of resources, that management
should aim to maximize shareholders wealth,119 many Europeans, at least to
a greater extent than their U.S. counterparts, believe that corporations
should serve a larger social purpose and be “responsible,” that is, they
should reach out to other stakeholders and not only to shareholders.120 This
perspective draws on fundamental beliefs about the role of the state and the
private sector, which differ between the United States and the European
Union. Corporate decisions have a significant effect on various groups,
such as employees, communities, and creditors. Thus proponents of
stakeholder governance contend that the effect of these decisions should
compel corporations to recognize ethical considerations and duties toward
these groups.
Two issues should be mentioned before discussing the implementation
of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. First, there is the paradox
that U.S. economists have elaborated stakeholder theory more than in
Europe,121 even though European corporations pay far more attention to
118
The European Commission adopted a proposal on April 16, 2013 for a directive enhancing the
transparency of certain large companies on social and environmental matters. This Directive amends
the Accounting Directives (Fourth and Seventh Accounting Directives on Annual and Consolidated
Accounts, 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, respectively). The objective is to increase EU companies’
transparency and performance on environmental and social matters, and, therefore, to contribute
effectively to long-term economic growth and employment. Companies concerned will need to disclose
information on policies, risks and results as regards environmental matters, social and employee-related
aspects, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues, and diversity on the boards of
directors. On February 6, 2013, the European Parliament adopted two resolutions acknowledging the
importance of company transparency in these fields. See Comm. on Legal Affairs, Eur. Parl., Report on
Corporate Social Responsibility: Accountable, Transparent and Responsible Business Behavior and
Sustainable Growth, A7-0017/2013 (Feb. 6, 2013), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-0017+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN; Comm. on
Employment and Social Affairs, Eur. Parl., Report on Corporate Social Responsibility: Promoting
Society’s Interests and a Route to Sustainable and Inclusive Recovery, A7-0023/2013 (Feb. 6, 2013),
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-0023
&language=EN.
119
See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 14–73 (2006).
120
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 4 (“Recent academic literature has focused on the
“stakeholder” model of the corporation as the principal alternative to the shareholder-oriented model.
The stakeholder model, however, is essentially just a combination of elements found in the older
manager-oriented and labor-oriented models.”).
121
Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder
Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 641, 676–718 (2011) (discussing the historical
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stakeholders in their governance and their practices.122 Second, we must
clarify to what the concept exactly refers. Stakeholder-oriented corporate
governance can have two different meanings.123 On the one hand, the
stakeholder concept may refer to a “broad mission of the management.”124
According to this view, management should aim at maximizing surplus
from the sum of the various stakeholders. On the other hand, the
stakeholder-oriented corporate governance may refer to the sharing of
control by stakeholders,125 such as codetermination in Germany.
Presumably, the two notions are related.126 For instance, it would be hard
for a manager to sacrifice profit to benefit a stakeholder not directly
associated with the company or its management. Further, by including
stakeholders that are in control of the company, it can be presumed that
they will consider the stakeholders in management’s mission.
This synthesized definition has a two-fold impact on the
implementation of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. First, it
gives priority to long-term strategy. According to the “broad mission of the
management” concept, managers have to pay attention not only to
shareholders’ interest, but also to the interests of employees, creditors, and
the public. These new managerial missions naturally imply that the
corporation’s existence is presumed to be robust and profitable into the
future. The managerial vision thus becomes more long-term focused rather
than short-term.127
debates on stakeholder theory in Germany and France).
122
At the time Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means started elaborating the foundations of what became
the economic model of agency theory, a debate took place between Berle and E. Merrick Dodd over
how to tackle the issue of separation between property and control. Dodd followed a novel pluralist approach
as he sought to expand the theory of “corporate realism” to include corporate social responsibility. He
accepted that the corporation is a real entity, distinct from its shareholders, but similar to any other real person,
that entity has a social role and should be subjected to the principles of citizenship. Thus, in the case of
corporate citizens, purely economic self-interest (i.e., profit maximization), may be subjected to other social
objectives. The adoption of a realist stance is crucial for the plausibility of this assertion. Thus, when Dodd
detached the corporate interest from shareholder interests, CSR could be inserted. Having dealt with the
definition problem of the corporate interests in this manner, Dodd was able to engage upon the accountability
issue. In a realistic view, since managers had to discharge their duties in accordance with the SR entity that is
distinct from its shareholders, they should also be expected to have “a sense of responsibility toward
employees, consumers, and the general public.” See E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties
of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935). In other words, Dodd’s answer to the
debate’s question was that managers are trustees for the corporation as SR person rather than for the
shareholders as Berle believed.
123
TIROLE, supra note 119, at 56.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
This priority strengthens the firm establishment of stable shareholding in the capital of large
companies, a little like the “hard cores” of the 1980s. For a redefinition of this notion, see Yann Paclot, Le
gouvernement d’entreprise, pour quoi faire? Quelques reflexions en relisant le code de gouvernement
d’entreprise des societies cotées, in LES GOUVERNANCES DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES FACE À LA CRISE: POUR UNE

276

R&M_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/20/14 7:36 PM

Quotas and the Transatlantic Divergence of Corporate Governance
34:249 (2014)

Second, this synthesized definition compels one to re-examine the
notion of the “corporation’s interest.” The argument can be challenged to
the extent that the notions of “profit” and “value” are distinguishable.
Corporate governance recommendations today, at least in European
countries, seek to provide economic operators with the means to create
value.128 This is nothing new, given that it was already the underlying idea
of agency theory. The analysis differs today in that it reverts to a more
respectful notion of the corporation, regarded as a legal person,
independent of its associates, who are not the “owners” of the corporation
itself. Corporations indeed appear to have a broader objective than merely
creating shareholder value, which results in distinguishing between the
corporation’s interest and the common interest of the shareholders.129
“Creating value” would thus suppose that the corporation itself grows more
valuable, and not solely that its shareholders grow richer.130
This notion naturally implies that the corporation is durable,
profitable, and even prosperous. In this respect, the corporation’s interest
does not begin and end with the shareholders’ interest, but implies taking
into account all the interests that companies must guarantee. Recognition
of a corporation’s broader interest and the aims of governance as they have
just been set out, tally perfectly: corporate bodies must fulfill their mission
to protect the corporation’s interest. In other words, they must create value
for the benefit of all the stakeholders. The resurgence of the corporation’s

MEILLEURE PROTECTION DE L’INTÉRÊT SOCIAL

279 (L.G.D.J. ed., 2010). Several studies prove that
companies with a core body of shareholders perform better and that increasing shareholder power
during hostile takeover bids is appropriate. New activism is emerging, in favour of legal tools, which
enable both shareholders and managers to adopt long-term strategies. This is seen in France by marked
opposition to returning to the principle of proportional votes, and in the double voting right granted to
white squares by Code de commerce Article L225-43. This concern is also shared by ethical
investment funds in which good governance practices, such as sustainable development and ethical
commitments, are key factors of assessment by market players. It is interesting to note that the crisis
does not appear to have weakened the trend in favour of socially responsible investing. Catherine
Malecki, l’Investissement socialement responsable: quelques remarques sur une valeur montante de la
gouvernance d’entreprise, in LES GOUVERNANCES DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES FACE À LA CRISE: POUR UNE
MEILLEURE PROTECTION DE L’INTÉRÊT SOCIAL 263 (L.G.D.J. ed., 2010). With 37% growth in a time of
crisis, CSR confirms its status as a “safe investment” and provides the advantage, today, of insisting
upon the “green economy.” See generally MANUEL FLAM, L’ÉCONOMIE VERTE (2010).
128
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
129
TIROLE, supra note 119, at 56–62; PIERRE-YVES GOMEZ & HARRY KORINE, L’ENTREPRISE DANS LA
DÉMOCRATIE: UNE THÉORIE POLITIQUE DU GOUVERNEMENT DES ENTREPRISES (De Boeck ed., 2009).
130

It is interesting to note than even U.K. legislation seems to have shifted toward a more
stakeholder-oriented concept. The enactment of Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 in the U.K.
has codified the duty to act in the interest of the company. Now, the director of a U.K. company must
act in a way they consider, in good faith, to be most likely to promote the success of the company “for
the benefit of its members as a whole and in doing so must have regard to the interests of employees,
the environment, the local community, suppliers and customers.” Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172
(U.K.).
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interest,131 of which corporate officers are the guardians, is central to new
theories seeking to distinguish the company’s interests from the ones who
own parts of its capital. In light of this notion, the role of executives can be
redefined, and corporation management can be integrated into a company’s
long-term scheme.132
One core objection to stakeholder governance is that it may weaken
the governance structure overall. One issue with the sharing of control
between investors and natural stakeholders is that it focuses less on income
generation than would be the case with exclusive investor control.133 But
two arguments can be made to address that objection. First, when priority
is given to a long-term strategy, it strengthens the establishment of stable
shareholding in the capital of large companies. Historically, France
experimented with this in the 1980s, with the so-called “hard core.”134
Today, the concern is also shared by ethical investment funds in which
good governance practices, such as sustainable development and ethical
commitments, are key factors of assessment by market players.135
Even though it is by no means synonymous with a stakeholder
approach, CSR has become a relevant financing tool for listed corporations.
To date, it has survived despite the financial crisis.136 Since 2012, the
European Commission defines corporate social responsibility as “the
responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society.”137 To fully meet
their social responsibility, enterprises “should have in place a process to
integrate social, environmental, ethical human rights and consumer concerns
into their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with
their stakeholders.”138 CSR allows collective or individual investment
based on social, ethical, environmental, or corporate governance criteria.
Even though its variety may be a source of complexity, it nonetheless
131

For a redefinition of this notion, see Paclot, supra note 127, at 279.
See François Guy Trébulle, Stakeholder Theory et Droit des Sociétés, 12 BULL. JOLY SOCIÉTÉS
1337 (2006); François Guy Trébulle, Stakeholder theory et droit des sociétés, 1 BULL. JOLY SOCIÉTÉS 7
(2007); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism—
and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011; Michael. E. Porter
& Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate
Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78–92; Geoffrey Heal et al., Corporate Social
Responsibility: Doing Well by Doing Good? (Wharton Sch. Working Paper, Sept. 2005); P. Escande,
RSE: Michael Porter plaide pour la shared value, LES ECHOS (Mar. 14, 2011).
133
TIROLE, supra note 119, at 59–60.
134
Again, what was called the “noyaux durs” in the 1980’s in France, or hard core, meant that the
new privatized corporation was still kept by a concentrated ownership, but it was too small to have a
majority on important decisions like takeovers or big strategic changes.
135
It is interesting to note that the crisis does not appear to have weakened the trend in favour of
socially responsible investing. See Malecki, supra note 127.
136
With 37% growth in a time of crisis, CSR confirms its status as a safe investment and provides
the advantage, today, of insisting upon the green economy. See generally FLAM, supra note 127.
137
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
138
Id.
132
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offers an important new way of investing. Despite its differences from
stakeholder-focused governance, the relevant feature of CSR is that, unlike
most common funds, it considers long-term profitability more important
that short-term profitability. CSR can involve socially responsible funds—
or so-called sustainable development funds—that focus on the adherence of
companies to sustainable development criteria (Scandinavian countries and
Germany are developing more of the “green funds” technique) or exclusion
funds (more faithful to the initial concept born in the United States with the
Quaker movement, which prohibited its members from investing in
companies operating in the weapons, tobacco, or even alcohol industries).
Thus, these funds are open to long-term institutional investors who are
aware that, far from being a “marketing” concern, these funds make it
possible to consider, within long-term strategies, questions relative to
climate change, threats to fundamental human rights, and matters
surrounding corporate governance. Therefore, CSR is at the heart of
stakeholder-oriented governance and expands stakeholder values into labor
and environmental laws.
Managerial accountability constitutes another issue for stakeholderoriented corporate governance. Unlike an executive with a well-defined
mission to maximize shareholder value—viewed as an objective task—the
socially-oriented manager faces a wide range of missions, most of which
are, by nature, not entirely measurable.139 Concretely, it may be that the
management’s invocation of multiple and hard-to-measure missions would
serve as an excuse for “self-serving behavior,” making managers less
accountable.140 This argument suggests that the competency criterion
should be restored.141
The corporate governance debates reviewed in this Article show a
radical theoretical dichotomy between the U.S. approach of corporate
governance and the European one. The next part will show that these
variations are deeply rooted in a cultural context.142
139

TIROLE, supra note 119, at 60.
Id.
141
One criticism of stakeholder-orientated governance is that it leaves the corporation with “two
masters”—stakeholders and shareholders—with the concomitant cost. Increased capital costs attend to
the stakeholder-oriented firms in the United States.
142
So far, demonstrations of this new conception of governance have been limited to giving rules of
law a remedial role, correcting certain cognitive mistakes made by executives. This stage would now
appear to be behind us, given the European Community’s establishment in 2008 of a much more
promising rule, that of compliance, or, to refer to its true English origin, “comply or explain.”
Introduced on July 3, 2008 transposing a provision of EC Directive 2006/46, this rule stipulates that
“when it voluntarily refers to a corporate governance code,” a listed corporation must specify in the
report enclosed with the management report “the provisions it has set aside and why,” or, if it “does not
refer to such a code,” it must state, in the same report “the rules applied in addition to legal
requirements and the reasons why it decided not to apply any provision of the code.” Council Directive
2006/46, 2006 O.J. (L 224) 1 (EC); Véronique Magnier, La règle de conformité ou l’illustration d’une
acculturation méthodologique complexe, in LES GOUVERNANCES DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES FACE À LA
140
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2. French Corporatism and the Role of Stakeholders
The U.S. system of corporate governance is characterized by the
largest businesses listed on securities markets with a very large
shareholding base.143 This base interacts with management at an arm’s
length basis. Thus, the state’s role in regulating private property and
private contracts is limited. At the opposite end of the spectrum, European
countries’ systems are traditionally characterized by the relative
unimportance of the securities market as a source of finance.144 According
to this tradition, the principal sources of finance in a country such as France
are banks, families, non-financial corporations, and the government.145
Shareholdings tend to be more concentrated, and shareholders, organized
labor, government, and creditors are more actively involved in the control
of companies. Financing now may be largely globalized as investors fund
corporations without much regard to their domicile, a factor that may
diminish the “Frenchness” of French corporations. Even so, the continued
presence of the French state as a large shareholder in key industries gives it
extensive influence, both formal and informal, over economic activity
within France.
Until the nineteenth century, full incorporation could not take place
unless a special charter was granted by statute or decree.146 The state was
heavily involved in the incorporation process. That is, for groups of
individuals to become legal persons, or corporations, a license from the state
was necessary. The 1866 law on incorporation, however, allowed a group of
individuals to become a corporation, without any concession from the state;
only registration was necessary.147 Still, many sectors of the economy
remained under the control of the state, which owned the capital of a great
number of companies. Strategic sectors like defense, of course, were state
owned.148 Additionally, railways, transportation, and electricity were the full

CRISE:

POUR UNE MEILLEURE PROTECTION DE L’INTÉRÊT SOCIAL 250 (L.G.D.J. ed., 2010). Compliance,
or rather non-compliance, is an opportunity for companies; it brings flexibility and is a real tool for
preventing cognitive errors in that, without imposing anything, the law suggests and models. On these
changes to the rules of law in general, see CATHERINE THIBIERGE, LA FORCE NORMATIVE, NAISSANCE
D’UN CONCEPT (2010). It provides an “architecture of choices,” which executives can simply use as a
basis for decision-making, but it still needs to be aided by a culture of motivation. See generally Cass R.
Sustein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159
(2008).
143
See generally MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISME CONTRE CAPITALISME (Seuil ed., 1991).
144
DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 117.
145
See generally GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 129.
146
MICHEL GERMAIN & VÉRONIQUE MAGNIER, TRAITÉ DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES: TOMES 2, LES
SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES (20th ed. 2011).
147
GEORGES RIPERT, ASPECTS JURIDIQUES DU CAPITALISME MODERNE (1951).
148
See generally GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 129.
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property of the state and submitted to specific public regulation.149
The institutional arrangements coming out of the Bretton Woods
Agreements in 1944 emerged from post-war devastation and aimed to
create a stable macroeconomic environment that would ensure continuous
investment and growth.150 Within that international framework, national
governments were able to implement expansionary policies, which ensured
that effective demand was sufficient to absorb increasing industrial
output.151 As part of this process of reconstruction, this post-war period
was characterized in France as a movement toward “nationalization.”152
Nationalization entails the transfer of property from the private sector to the
state. The state then recapitalizes many large companies with public
money. This movement started no later than December 1944 with the
nationalization of Renault, and then, in December 1945, with banks such as
Crédit Lyonnais, le Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris, la Banque
Nationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie, and la Société Générale.153 It
ended in 1948 with coal, gas and electricity, insurance companies, and
transportation.154 In October 1946, the preamble of the newly drafted
Constitution stressed the importance of this political decision to recapitalize
a major part of the private economy with public funds.155
Although privatization developed for decades, this progression shifted
when President Mitterrand undertook a wave of nationalizations in the
eighties. Seven big industrial companies (such as Thomson, RhônePoulenc and Saint-Gobain) and almost thirty banks became held by the
state. France belongs to the so-called “insider” systems, where shareholdings
tend to be more concentrated, and government and (public) creditors are
more actively involved in the control of the corporations.156 French
corporatism reflects the role of the state in the private sector and a
commensurate acquiescence to public goals within the private sector.
These public goals necessarily implicate issues and participation supported
by stakeholders. As a result, the French corporate governance system in
the private sector is stakeholder oriented and forms part of a tightly woven
protective social market infrastructure

149

Id.
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 129
155
1946 CONST. pmbl., art. 9 (Fr.) (“Tout bien, toute entreprise, dont l’exploitation a ou acquiert les
caractères d’un service public national ou d’un monopole de fait, doit devenir la propriété de la
collectivité.”).
156
DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 117, at chs. 2, 5.
150
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IV. CURRENCY OF STAKEHOLDER PRACTICE
The theoretical debate surrounding corporate governance already
appears in legal jurisdictions at the national, European, and international
levels, and its controversy continues to increase.
A. The EU and Growing International Interest in StakeholderOriented Corporate Governance
Currently, several factors, both economic and more general, have
prompted the European Commission to question the state of corporate
governance on both a micro- and macro-economic level in order to restore
confidence in the single market for shareholders and for all other
stakeholders in society.157 The global financial crisis exposed the limits of
the present system of governance of financial institutions. The volatility of
the global marketplace struck every developed economy, in nearly all
sectors. Without bringing the fundamentals of the governance of private
law companies into question in this post-crisis period, policymakers should
concern themselves with the development of corporate governance, which,
by nature, is not static.
Different shareholding structures of companies result in differing
governance and performance.158 For example, in France, one-third of
businesses listed on a regulated market use dispersed shareholding whereas
two-thirds of businesses use a dominant family shareholding.159 Therefore,
of particular concern are those in the first third, as family businesses are
traditionally better managed and perform better.160 We must bear in mind
that important points of departure exist between the U.S. and European
financial systems. One interesting difference relates to the size of the stock
market. Anglo-Saxon countries have well-developed stock markets,
whereas in Europe, stock markets are smaller. Further, in France and
Germany, many relatively large firms choose to remain private.161 There
are also wide variations in the concentration of shares across countries.
Family-owned firms play a major role.162 Firms with one controlling
owner are not rare and, frequently, family-controlled firms have top
managers from the controlling family. In contrast, ownership concentration
is much smaller in Anglo-Saxon countries and ownership is largely
dispersed in the United States. A last point of departure between the two
157

See generally EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 608) (2011).
See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737 (1995).
159
GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 129.
160
David Sraer & David Thesmar, Performance and Behavior of Family Firms: Evidence from the
French Stock Market, 4 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 709 (2007).
161
TIROLE, supra note 119.
162
GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 129.
158
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systems is the degree of stability of stockholdings. Institutional investors
dominate liquidity trading in the United States. They reshuffle their
portfolios frequently. German investors have traditionally been long-term
investors. The turnover rate is thus an important difference between the
United States and Europe, and these differences have a significant impact
on corporation practices. Therefore, the solutions imposed on U.S.
companies do not necessarily apply to European companies, whose
shareholders are more concentrated.163
According to several recent European studies, including one on the
European Corporate Governance Framework, the aim of corporate
governance should be to create value for shareholders and stakeholders.164
Indeed, OECD norms reflect this perspective. The OECD effectively
defines corporate governance as “the system by which companies are
directed and controlled” and as “a set of relationships between a
corporation’s management, its board, its shareholders, and its other
stakeholders.”165
Another important European shift in this direction, with the ultimate
aim being the prosperity and long-term future of the company, is the
emergence of sustainable development in its most recent forms. Originally,
CSR166 was a matter of self-regulation. Its aim was to correct “the natural
163

Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 158, at 737–83.
See FLAM, supra note 127. PIERRE-YVES Gomez, Propos conclusifs, in LES GOUVERNANCES
DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES FACE À LA CRISE: POUR UNE MEILLEURE PROTECTION DE L’INTÉRÊT SOCIAL 290
(L.G.D.J. ed., 2010).
165
OECD, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE 11 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/
corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.
166
By tradition, the leading CSR market on its own represents 65% of CSR funds, though it also
exists in Canada, South Africa, Asia, Morocco, and naturally, in the Scandinavian countries. In France,
the Novethic indicator is indicative of the constant growth of CSR, while the leader in the French market is
Dexia AM. Insurance companies, pension funds, and collective investment undertakings are increasingly
sensitive to CSR. Companies in the chemical and petroleum sectors, clearly the most concerned by CSR, and
even more so banking establishments that are in charge of accompanying industrial investments, pay very
particular attention to CSR. Since 2005, the CERES annual reports have clearly indicated an change of
attitude in the banking sector, which is including environmental data as part of risk management. CSR is at the
heart of the stakeholder approach, through the values that it spreads into labor and environmental laws, and
France, which has been concerned with corporate governance issues since the beginning of 2000s, has recently
been sensitive to this trend. Hence, the burden of social and environmental duties weighing on listed
corporations has been strengthened by the passage of the Grenelle II Act. Since 2001, French law required
listed companies to report in their annual report on “how the corporation is taking into account the social and
environmental consequences of its activities.” Loi 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national
pour l’environnement [Law 2010-788 of July 12, 2010 on the National Commitment for the Environment],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 13, 2010, p.
12905. The implementing decree of the 2001 law (February 20, 2002) drew up a list of social and
environmental information that the corporation was required to provide, ranging from the consumption of
water resources, raw materials and energy, greenhouse gas emissions, and equality of opportunity between
men and women to the inclusion of the disabled. The weakness of the CSR is that it is based on voluntary
commitments, and the 2001 law provided for no specific sanction in the event that the information obligation
is not respected. Still, the Grenelle II Act, passed in July 2010, in addition to extending the scope of this
164
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effects of markets, in response to the expectations of other than economic
actors in contemporary societies.”167 Therefore, it was defined by the
European Commission as “a concept whereby companies integrate social
and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.”168 Despite CSR’s
voluntary origins, the European Commission recently turned its attention to
redefining it. A recent, non-binding communication states that CSR may
turn out to merely be “the responsibility of enterprises for their impact on
society.”169 Nor is this change in emphasis an isolated occurrence.
International Standard ISO 26000170 actually goes further, requiring
companies to adopt “transparent and ethical behaviour that contributes to
sustainable development.”171 Thus, CSR is moving away from a voluntary
basis to a required method of conducting corporate governance.
In limited companies, the guarantors of the corporation’s interest are
the board of directors and the supervisory board, not shareholders. The
latter may, legitimately, vote in favor of their own self-serving interests—
for example, by fixing a high rate of dividends, despite the fact that such a
rate would impede the development of the business. The role of the board
of directors and the supervisory board to protect the corporations’ interest
is thus vital to good corporate governance. Moreover, the reflections of the
1992 Cadbury Report, the precursor to all other European corporate
governance codes, and the first governance committees presided over by
Marc Viénot in France, were dedicated to the effective functioning of the
board of directors.
The emergence of a broadly defined corporate interest, as stakeholder
theory understands it, now reinforces the custom of stable shareholdings in
the capital of large companies and encourages directors to adopt a more
long-term strategy.
information to almost all companies, makes the obligation of information enforceable.
167
Michel Doucin, Dimension internationale de la responsabilité sociale et environnementale, in
DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE ET ENTREPRISE 15–22 (Véronique Magnier & Laurent Fonbaustier eds.,
2013).
168
Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social
Responsibility, at 6, COM (2011) 681 final (Oct. 25, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=5511.
169
EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 681) 2 (2011).
170
ISO 26000 provides guidance on social responsibility (SR). Eighty countries and thirty-nine
organizations with liaison status are participating in the SR working group under the joint leadership of ISO
members from Brazil (ABNT) and Sweden (SIS). The main stakeholder groups are represented: industry,
government, labor, consumers, nongovernmental organizations, service, support, research, and others, as well
as a geographical and gender-based balance of participants. ISO 26000 Social Responsibility, INT’L ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
171
ISO 26000 defines CSR as “the responsibility of an organisation for the impact of its decisions
and activities on society and the environment, through transparent and ethical behaviour that contributes
to sustainable development.” Id.
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B. Structural Differentials
The board of directors plays a central role in corporate governance,
and one crucial characteristic to consider is whether that board has one or
two tiers. Typically, Germany employs a traditional two-tier model that is
known in Europe as the “Rhine model.”172 Recently, there were significant
legal changes to board structures in Europe. This subpart explores the core
elements of French and German boards that distinguish them from U.S.
boards, and articulates the structural basis for stakeholderism in European
board governance.
1. One and Two-Tiered Boards: Contrasting French and German
Governance
In Germany, as in other European countries—including the
Netherlands, Austria, Poland, and Portugal—a two-tier board with
separated management and supervisory boards is required.173 Two-tier
boards have existed since 1619 in the Netherlands.174 Legal regimes
separate management from control. Mandatory incompatibility rules
support this separation, which stipulates that members of the supervisory
board are forbidden from being directors, and vice-versa. In practice,
though, the supervisory board has rarely limited itself to mere control and
instead has taken on an advisory function. As Klaus Hopt explains:
[T]he division between the tasks of the management board and
the supervisory board varies according to business sector, size of
the corporation, tradition and, in particular, the presence of
strong leaders on the board or the other. Sometimes the
chairman of the management board, alone or together with the
chairman of the supervisory board, selects the members of the
supervisory board without much ado, though formally they must
be elected by shareholders. Sometimes the chairman of the
supervisory board is the leading figure on whose benevolence the
chairman of the management board depends, and who picks the
other supervisory members and proposes them to the
shareholders.175

172

See generally ALBERT, supra note 143.
Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: the State of the Art and International
Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2011).
174
Id.
175
Id. at 21.
173
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In a single-tier system, which is commonplace in the United States,
shareholders elect board members to one board, which oversees the entire
corporation. For U.S. firms, the two-tier system can appear to be quite
sophisticated and complicated, in part because the supervisory role may
implicate distinct duties in different firms. In a two-tier board structure,
there is an executive board and a supervisory board. In Germany, the latter
is composed entirely of nonexecutive board members, half of whom are
labor representatives. In Germany, the main reason for the strict
maintenance of the two-tier board is the politically cemented policy of
labor codetermination, which is hardly tolerable for shareholders in a onetier system.
In 1966, France introduced the possibility of choosing a two-tier
model, but many corporations still retain the traditional one-tier system.
The study of numerous French and European companies reveals that a high
majority of boards of directors in France (eighty percent of companies in
the CAC 40) in comparison to supervisory boards.176 In the aftermath of
the financial crisis, many corporations that had initially chosen a two-tier
system shifted to a one-tier model for economic and flexibility reasons.177
French law defines how the board is designated. In a one-tier system,
shareholders select members of the board. In practice, however, members
of the board are first identified and chosen by the president director
general, with the help of the nomination committee. The Corporations Act
contains very few provisions regarding the composition of the board, with
the exception of provisions relating to the minimum (3) and maximum (18)
size, the duration of office, and the gender quota. Staggered boards and
cumulative voting are not permitted, nor is mandatory minority shareholder
representation. Indeed, in France, few prescriptions for the board structure
exist, rendering the codetermination requirement a distinct feature of
German board governance.
Since 2001, the chairman of the board of directors does not assume, in
principle, the general direction of the corporation. This role has devolved
to the chief executive officer, who is fully autonomous within the
corporation and not subordinate to the chairperson. It should be noted,
however, that the chairman may also—but is not obliged to—exercise the
functions of chief executive officer.178 Studies show that the separation of
powers between the chairman and chief executive officer in single-tier
companies is in rapid decline. In fact, the proportion of directing chairpersons
176
Alain Pietrancosta, Paul-Henri Dubois & Romain Garçon, Corporate Boards in France, in
CORPORATE BOARDS IN EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN EUROPE 175, 185 (2014).
177
Christophe Perchet, Pertinence et pérennité de la SA avec conseil d’administration, 4 BULLETIN
JOLY SOCIÉTÉS 440, § 86 (2009) (explaining this preference with reference to the numerous
disadvantages associated with the dualist model—most importantly the unsatisfactory distribution of
powers and responsibilities between the directors and the supervisory board—and the multiple
advantages of the monist model).
178
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. 225-51-1, para. 1 (Fr.).
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increased in 2011, reaching fifty-five percent of companies on the index.179
The board of directors is responsible for deciding whether the
functions of the chief executive officer are to be exercised by the chairman
of the board or by another individual.180 The articles of incorporation must
define the conditions under which the board of directors decides this
matter. Thus, a particular majority of the board may be required for
approval, or it may be necessary to adhere to a specific time period (for
example, the end of the current mandate) before passing from one method
to another. Shareholders may be informed of the decision of the board of
directors, either at any time of year upon request—this right forms part of
the shareholders’ permanent communication right181 —or annually at the
general meeting. According to the AFEP-MEDEF Corporate Governance
Code, “[i]t is essential for the shareholders and third parties to be fully
informed of the choice made.”182 Listed companies that have chosen to
refer to this code must account for their choice through compliance with
the “comply or explain” rule.183
Practitioners are conscious of the risk to the reputation of big French
companies posed by investing an excess of power in an individual rather
than an office. As the Vivendi and Société Générale cases have shown, the
fall of a very charismatic chief executive officer damages the corporation’s
image.184 Consequently, a new figure has gradually emerged in businesses
with boards of directors in which the functions of the chairperson of the
board and chief executive officer are still united: the lead director
(administrateur référent). The characteristics, duties, and prerogatives of
this director are defined for the most part in the internal regulations of the
board of directors. Primarily, the aim is to guarantee the prerogatives of
the board of directors and respect good governance practices in the context
of a directorship exercised by a Chairman-CEO.185 The AMF, which
encourages this practice in hopes of preventing conflicts of interest
associated with holding the dual functions of CEO and chairman,186
179

See ERNST & YOUNG, PANORAMA DES PRATIQUES DE GOUVERNANCE DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES
(2012), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Etude_Gouvernance_
2012/$FILE/Etude_Gouvernance_2012.pdf.
180
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. 225-51-1, para. 2 (Fr.).
181
FRANCIS LEFEBVRE, MÉMENTO PRATIQUE: SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES (2011).
182
ASS’N FRANÇAISE DE ENTREPRISES PRIVÉES & MOUVEMENT DES ENTREPRISES DE FRANCE
[AFEP-MEDEF], CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE OF LISTED CORPORATIONS 4 (2013), available at
http://total.com/en/AFEP-MEDEF-code.
183
Under French law, internal regulations are not required by law, but almost all listed companies
have them.
184
See, e.g., Florence Renard-Gourdon, Le sept vies de Jean-Marie Messier, LESECHOS.FR (Jan. 21,
2011), http://www.lesechos.fr/entreprises-secteurs/tech-medias/dossier/300390167/300390167-les-septvies-de-jean-marie-messier-99922.php.
185
It is worth noting that the United States has seen a significant push by shareholders and proxy
advisors to split the Chair from the CEO position.
186
AUTORITÉ DES MARCHÉS FIANCIERS, RAPPORT 2010 DE L’AMF SUR LE GOUVERNEMENT
FRANÇAISES
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recommends that companies which have put a lead director in place
precisely define his role and duties along with the means and prerogatives
he possesses. The AMF envisages that the functions of this individual will
be further refined during the evaluation of the board of directors or in the
report of the chairman on the governance of the corporation.
Moreover, independent directors, as distinguished from non-executive
directors and outside directors, are considered an important aspect of
corporate governance in France. Although French law does not require the
independence of directors, the AFEP-MEDEF states that, for listed
companies without a controlling shareholder, half of the directors must be
independent, and in other companies, at least a third.187 Independent
directors should account for two-thirds of the audit committee, and on other
committees, half of the members should be independent.188 This role for
independent directors reflects a European trend in corporate governance
that focuses on board composition. The actual criteria for independence,
however, remain unclear—specifically who should determine the
independence of a non-executive director. There has been no consensus on
this issue in France or in Europe.189
2. Representation of Labor on Boards
In many European countries, there is mandatory codetermination, but
in such cases, labor usually represents one-third of board membership.190
For example, Germany traditionally has the most stringent rule regarding
codetermination.191 That occurred as a result of Germany’s need to
stabilize its economy after WWII, and, therefore, relies on the “social
peace” theory that appeals to dialogue and negotiations between managers
and workers. Consequently, Germany mandates shareholder and labor
membership parity on the supervisory board. This mandated parity exists
in conjunction with a mandatory large size (more than twenty), and a twotier structure. Commenting on this structure, Hansmann and Kraakman
note that “[t]oday, even inside Germany, few commentators argue for
codetermination as a general model for corporate law in other jurisdictions.
Rather, codetermination now tends to be defended in Germany as, at most,
a workable adaptation to local interests and circumstances or, even more
modestly, as an experiment of questionable value that would now be

D’ENTREPRISE ET LA RÉMUNÉRATION DES DIRIGEANTS

[AMF REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
12, 2010).
187
See CODE DE GOUVERNEMENT D’ENTREPRISE DES SOCIÉTÉS COTÉES [CORPORATE GOVERNMENT
CODE], art. 9 (2013) (Fr.).
188
Id.
189
Hopt, supra note 173, at 2720.
190
Id.
191
Id.
AND THE REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS] (July
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politically difficult to undo.”192 Regardless of whether labor codetermination
continues as a result of tradition or an ongoing belief in its contributions, it
does accord this centrally important stakeholder some shared role in
governance.
France, conversely, is more circumspect about labor participation on
the board of directors. France has recently and cautiously followed the
trend toward codetermination by giving labor, under certain circumstances,
up to two seats on the board of a listed corporation, whether it is a one- or a
two-tier system. Since 2002, this is a voluntary option, provided that
employees own more than three percent of the capital. This choice is
determined by shareholders who vote on whether to give these two seats to
labor representatives. In practice, “shareholders are not fond of labor
codetermination, because it diminishes the power of their own candidates
and seriously weaken[s] their role in the decision-making of the board.”193
It should be noted that, in France, worker representatives also dislike this
codetermination approach, evidenced by their reticence to have their anticapitalist perspective co-opted into the corporate structure.194 Under this
approach, labor law is considered much more protective of workers than
corporate law.
Accordingly, apart from the right to be represented on the board, labor
rights in France are protected by other mechanisms. For example, the
European Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 provides for
information rights of labor representatives of the two corporations involved
in a bid as soon as it has been made public.195 The offer document must
contain information relevant to the bidder’s intention with regard to the
future business of the target corporation and the likely repercussions for
employment. Later, there must also be information for, and consultation
with, the representative’s employees. More generally, although traditionally
protective of employees’ rights, French labor law is becoming more
protective thanks to the EU directives.196

192

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 5–6.
Id. at 53.
194
Unions in the U.K. were skeptical for the same reasons during the 1970s when codetermination
was considered. See generally ALAN BULLOCK & BARRON BULLOCK, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
INQUIRY INTO INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1977).
195
Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12.
196
See, e.g., Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
2002 Establishing a General Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees in the European
Community, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29; Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the
Establishment of a European Works Council or a Procedure in Community-scale Undertakings and
Community-scale Groups of Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and Consulting Employees,
1994 O.J. (L 254) 64.
193
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C. Possible Effect of FCBQ on Stakeholders
The FCBQ will, over the course of a short period of time, force the
inclusion of a critical mass of women on the boards of French corporations.
Even though France already accords substantial room for stakeholder
interests, it seems likely that the FCBQ will further increase the stakeholder
orientation of those corporations. As a descriptive matter, more women
will populate corporate boards.
Here, “descriptive” has a specific meaning. Hanna Pitkin first
explored this concept in The Concept of Representation,197 where she
distinguished “descriptive” from “interest” representation.198 Her work
focused on the context of political representation, in which she addressed
how “descriptive” representation involves “a descriptive likeness between
representatives and those for whom they stand.”199 This is representation
by identity. In this sense, “[a] representative legislature, like a map or a
mirror, is essentially an inanimate object, a representation of the people in
the sense that a painting is a representation of what it depicts.”200 A
descriptive legislature must mirror the public. In such a case, one ought to
be represented because of what one is, not for what one does or believes.201
Pitkin criticized descriptive representation as a static portrait of a society in
which a group’s representation resides in someone with a like trait.202 By
contrast, “interest” representation is about the expression of ideas. Interest
representation involves a common belief or idea that finds representation in
someone who agrees with that ideology, without regard to identity.203
In the corporate context, “descriptive” and “interest” representation
help explain the effects of the quota with regard to stakeholder interests.
Stakeholder interests can take the form of either descriptive or interest
representation. Although stakeholder perspectives often relate to ideas
such as environmental concerns, they can also involve descriptive
representation, such as the presence of worker representatives on a board, a
requirement common to many European corporate governance regimes.204
Descriptive representation encompasses certain elements of women’s
presence on corporate boards. Women on boards can serve a symbolic
role.205 As the parties who oversee management, boards sit at the top of the
197

HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
For an argument regarding the centrality of interest representation for lesbian and gay political
representation, see generally Darren Rosenblum, Geographically Sexual?: Advancing Lesbian and Gay
Interests Through Proportional Representation, 31 HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (1996).
199
PITKIN, supra note 197 at 11.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 10.
202
Id.; Guinier, supra note 76, at 1102.
203
PITKIN, supra note 197; Rosenblum, supra note 198, at 121.
204
See supra Part IV.B.2.
205
PITKIN, supra note 197.
198
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corporate hierarchy, and the inclusion of women conveys to women lower
in the hierarchy that their ambition will not be frustrated based on their
gender.
Within European corporate governance culture, women may play a
role comparable to that played by labor representatives. Like labor
representatives, they would be present because of their identity as women.
Women’s presence reflects their place at the table in a similar sense to that
of labor. Women differ from labor representatives because the board will
select them for membership, whereas unions themselves select their
representatives as separately chosen board members.
Unlike labor representatives (who presumably favor protecting
workers’ rights), a woman has no necessary interests in common with other
women. Women’s descriptive representation on boards cannot be assumed
to imply any congruence of interests. To assert that women on a corporate
board will represent women’s interests requires leaps of logic beyond the
scope of this Article. Without belaboring this point, which will be
addressed elsewhere,206 it would be challenging to formulate what common
opinions women hold. It would be a daunting task just to determine which
female stakeholders demographic is represented by the women on the
board. One can imagine a broad swath of diverse groups of women:
women employees, women management, women customers, community
members, and even girls who may eventually seek elevated corporate posts
could all constitute a group that would conceivably have some stakeholder
interest in women on boards. Even if one were to fix an appropriate set of
these groups, what common interests might they hold? Although the
women on boards clearly qualify as a discrete group, their interests would
be difficult to enumerate.207
Briefly, we cannot assume that a specific woman, or even a group of
206

Darren Rosenblum will explore questions of identity more closely in a subsequent paper.
The anti-essentialist’s desire to avoid “tokenism” caused by descriptive representation has led to
calls for interest representation. Representing ideas rather than identity permits a more fluid conception
of identity, be it gender, race, or sexual orientation. See generally Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The
Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1462 (1991). Representation of interests prioritizes
one’s political perspective over one’s identity. It is worth noting that essentialist identities could also
lead to interest representation: another critique of descriptive representation centers on the fact that it is
unclear how to achieve a fair sample of the electorate. See generally Bernard Grofman, Should
Representatives Be Typical of their Constituents?, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES
(Bernard Grofman et. al. eds., 1982). Thus, while anti-essentialism necessitates interest representation,
interest representation does not require an anti-essentialist understanding of identity. If identity has no
causal relation to ideas, representing individuals based on interest becomes paramount in a democracy.
The challenge with interest representation for women is the indeterminacy of what policies women
prefer. Social science reflects some preferences among women for some policies, but these preferences
may not be easily predictable. For example, Esther Duflo has examined women’s quotas in India,
studying the political preferences of women in certain villages and inquiring whether women
representatives reflect those preferences. Her conclusion is that such a connection does exist. See
Esther Duflo, Why Political Reservations?, 3 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 668, 668–78 (2005).
207
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women, on a corporate board will hold any specific interest.208 To assert
that “women” have some natural commonality with other “women”
requires an essentialist conception of sex difference.209 Given that “[t]he
advocacy of descriptive representation can emphasize the worst features of
essentialism,”210 it is hard to justify descriptive representation. Nonetheless,
without descriptive representation or some identity marking the
208

This reflects current understandings of the nature of sex difference, which have veered away
from presuming an “essential” aspect to sex difference, toward the recognition of the diversity among
individuals that crosses the sexes. Judith Butler and other gender theorists articulate understandings of
gender grounded in performativity rather than fundamental traits. Anti-essentialist feminism holds that
no essential notion of ‘womanhood’ exists. Black feminists such as Bell Hooks and Kimberle
Crenshaw have emphasized the white nature of such concepts, asserting that one cannot separate race
from gender.
208
Gender theorists, led by U.S. thinkers such as Judith Butler, hold that notions of “womanhood”
depend exclusively on cultural constructs, hence the use of “gender” rather than “sex” reflects a
constructed, rather than biological, phenomenon. These doubts lead to a counter theory that identity
does not determine ideas. For example, anti-essentialists reject presumptions that women are hardwired nurturers, ascribing such behaviors to cultural constructs. The construction of gender cannot be
discussed without consideration of transgendered identity. Transgendered identity demonstrates the
mutability of gender. Transgendered people expose the fallacy of the presumption that humanity is
composed solely of men and women—“gender binarism” calls into question the viability of a fifty-fifty
scheme for representation unless there is some implicit recognition of how to include transgendered
people in this scheme. See generally, Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing: Transgendered
Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499 (2000). Although the
essentialism debate primarily arises with regard to gender, many have raised such questions with regard
to race. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FATHER’S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CULTURE 45 (1992).
209
The dichotomy between descriptive and interest representation parallels a dichotomy in the
women’s identity debate between essentialism and anti-essentialism. There appears to be a necessary
relationship between these dichotomies. Women’s representation quotas appear to presume that a
woman can only be represented by a woman. Quotas in this sense rely on essentialism. Antiessentialist theory undermines such notions of fixed identity. To essentialists, it is without meaning to
be a woman as opposed to a man. This theory, it would appear, can only serve to question quotas for
women’s representation. Anti-essentialists would hold that a woman is no more likely to represent
women’s interests than a man. The extension of this is that if women, as a group, have no traits in
common, then having fifty percent of all candidates does not achieve any greater likelihood of
representing women. Even with a presumption of essentialist identity, one can arrive at the need for
interest representation. But can anti-essentialism lead one to support descriptive representation? The
question of women’s representation, it seems, cannot be answered with context-less advocacy that
ignores key anti-essentialist lessons in advocating that women be guaranteed seats to represent women.
Any particular woman cannot be presumed to represent any other woman, or women as a whole, for
that matter. Becker, for example, seems to advocate that women be guaranteed seats to represent
women, without addressing complexities of identity. The intriguing element of this issue is that, the
above anti-essentialist truths notwithstanding, they cannot necessarily be generalized: simply because
an individual woman cannot be assumed to represent another woman does not mean that if half the
legislature were women that this legislature would do no better in voicing women’s interests than an
entirely male legislature. Although one’s body cannot fully determine one’s politics, some relation
must be present. Perhaps a solution is suggested by Gayitri Spivak’s idea of strategic essentialism, or
Judith Butler’s idea of “contingent epistemology.” GAYATRI SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN
CULTURAL POLITICS (1987).
210
Mansbridge, supra note 77, at 30.
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representative and the people represented, quotas cannot exist. The reality
of the existence of corporate board quotas cannot be separated from
enforcing some level of descriptive representation of women.
It can be asserted that the presence of women at the top of the
corporate hierarchy will necessarily have an impact on the fundamental
nature of European corporate governance. In contrast with other corporate
cultures, European corporations will have more women in more prominent
positions. Even without presuming some interest commonality, as a
descriptive matter, European corporate culture will be feminized in the
literal sense of having more women participants, particularly in contrast
with the rest of the developed world where women constitute a far smaller
percentage of board members.
As clear as the descriptive argument may be that women’s presence
renders a corporation more stakeholder-friendly, as a matter of interest
representation, it remains unclear as to what the impact will be. As we
established, the presence of women on the boards of France’s (and possibly
Europe’s) largest companies will lead to great descriptive representation of
women on the board, and this descriptive representation, in one important
yet simple sense, will result in an increase in stakeholder governance as
women (at least descriptively) constitute stakeholders. Even if the group
“women” in this corporate context does not necessarily share some values
that lead to distinct results, their presence may provide some stakeholder
representation for women workers, consumers, and community members.
At the outside, a potential exists that policies such as childcare and other
issues may shift, but this truly depends on whether people inhabiting the
category “women” have any common interest.
Some studies demonstrate that “women” actually have distinct
perspectives. If women board members hew to stereotypes (as some
studies suggest), they would attend to vulnerable populations. In a
landmark study on women’s political representation in India, Esther Duflo
demonstrated that women leaders do in fact hold different opinions from
male leaders, and these opinions match their represented populations by
sex.211 If Duflo’s assertions were correct in a broader sense, women board
members may attend to stakeholder needs, whether those stakeholders are
women, workers, parents, or other vulnerable populations whose interests
may be marginalized in a shareholder-driven governance. Indeed, as David
Matsa and Amalia Miller’s work explores, women in upper management
may help advance other women.212 Work that inherently requires creative
problem solving aspects would benefit from diversity, but in the corporate
governance context, the effect is tempered because of the nature of the
211
Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a
Randomized Policy Experiment in India, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1409 (2004).
212
David Matsa & Amalia Miller, Chipping Away at the Glass Ceiling: Gender Spillovers in
Corporate Leadership, 101 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 635–39 (2011).
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work performed by boards.213 The feminization of corporate governance,
brought about by CBQs in the European context, may lead to still more
stakeholder-oriented governance. Even if this phenomenon occurs in a
small percentage of corporations, it may lead to a notable shift in
governance overall.
D. CBQs and the Possible Effect on Entrenched Director Interests
Two counterexamples still exist in and deeply hamper French
corporate governance practice: first, the exclusive social network of
directors, and second, the number of cumulative mandates. The FCBQ will
help challenge both of these traditional pitfalls.
One crucial concern regarding the composition of boards in French
corporations seems to be only partially addressed at the present moment:
the lack of socio-economic diversity on these boards. The AFEP-MEDEF
Code says nothing about necessary social diversity.214 Moreover, it does
not tackle a related issue and great French “exception”—the very strong
representation and predominance of some Grandes Écoles on the boards of
directors of large listed companies.215 Without question, everywhere, the
market for corporate directors is narrow. This is understandable as very
specific skills and expertise are required for such a position. It may also be
a sociological tropism: this phenomenon is not unique to the French
system, but also exists in the United States (with Ivy League graduates) and
in the United Kingdom (with graduates of prestigious universities like
Oxford). However, France is a particularly well-suited and atypical case.216
The sociological literature documents that, among French business elites,
two broad and distinct networks coexist: engineers (École Polytechnique)
and former high-ranking civil servants (École Nationale d’Administration).217
213
The work of Scott Page and Jonathan Macey are informative for this point. Page’s work
identifies that diversity provides effective results in tasks that require creativity as opposed to simple
repetitive tasks. But what is the nature of the tasks for corporate boards? Macey’s work divides the
tasks of corporate boards into monitoring work and management duties. The inherent function of
overseeing and approving work doesn’t lend itself to shifts in decision making as a result of increased
board diversity. These themes that examine the nature of diversity and its effect on board shifts is the
focus in subsequent work. See Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, Sex Regimes and Corporate
Governance 65 (Working Paper) (on file with author).
214
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
215
Bang Dang Nguyen, Does the Rolodex Matter? Corporate Elite’s Small World and the
Effectiveness of Board Directors, 58 MGMT. SCI. 236, 236 (2012); Franics Kramaz & David Thesmar,
Social Networks in the Boardroom 7 (Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No.
1940, 2006).
216
Id. at 2.
217
See David Swartz, French Interlocking Directorships: Financial and Industrial Groups, in
NETWORKS OF CORPORATE POWER: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TEN COUNTRIES (Frans N.
Stokman ed., 1985); David Swartz, French Corporate Leadership: A Class Based Technocracy, 2 RES.
POL. SOC. 49 (1986); Charles Kadushin, Friendship Among the French Financial Elite, 60 AM. SOC.
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Elites are highly concentrated so that these two schools are overrepresented
among top executives. Moreover, these educational programs are the
“virtually unique way”218 of entering high-level jobs. A recent study, based
on reliable empirical findings, demonstrated that the presence of developed
social networks within boards of directors can have a very strong impact on
the composition of such boards, and a highly negative influence on
corporate governance practices.219 Although this is one study, one can
easily imagine that the impact of a small social network, say of people from
the same school or even the same graduating class, might deploy shortcuts
in decision making out of trust for one another in ways that diverse
individuals would not.
Another concern has emerged, a legal one, explaining that the French
issue of lack of diversity is not only linked to a sociological cause—an
exclusive social network club—but also to the legally prescribed pitfall of
cumulative proxies. The issue of concurrently held mandates has long
preoccupied France. Originally, the Law of July 24, 1966 limited the
number of mandates that may be concurrently held to eight.220 The Law of
May 15, 2001 reduced this number to five mandates on boards of directors,
and the AFEP-MEDEF now recommends the presence of a high number of
independent directors on boards and various committees.221 Despite these
developments, statistical studies continue to show a very high level of
director-consanguinity between CAC 40 and SBF 120 companies.222 Just
under half of all mandates in the CAC 40 are held by a quarter of their
directors.223 There are certain SBF 120 companies in which four people are
executives, but this remains quite rare. Moreover, French law allows
several exceptions to the five mandates rule. In particular, mandates held
concurrently within a related group of companies only count as one.
Furthermore, mandates held abroad are not counted. In addition to the
difficulties of interpretation to which this law has given rise, these
exceptions are not justified. There is no generalized method for counting
mandates, and the limit on concurrently held mandates do not apply to all
limited companies, private companies, and joint-stock companies.
Although the French case is not unique,224 it seems that France has
REV. 202 (1995); Kenneth A. Frank & Jeffrey Y. Yasumoto, Linking Action to Social Structure Within
a System: Social Capital Within and Between Subgroups, 104 AM. J. SOC. 642 (1998).
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FRANCE], July 26, 1966, p. 6402.
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had the most difficulty in combating the cumulative issue. The concurrent
holding of mandates presents three disadvantages: it reduces the variety of
points of view, limits the renewal of boards of directors, and encourages
the exchange of “services rendered” among board members who
consequently give each other reciprocal carte blanche.225 More recent
concerns against multiple directorships have focused on the challenges of
dividing one’s focus among several firms, an issue that has surfaced in
Norway after the implementation of their corporate board quota.
In spite of its shortcomings, the FCBQ marks an important first step
toward diversification, even if it is defined by mixité of the sexes rather
than a broader diversité. First, without question, a feminized corporate
culture will appear different, as women, many of whom have different sets
of professional experiences, take the positions once held by men on
corporate boards. Some quota advocates have argued that women’s
differences will shift corporate culture in a positive fashion. Such traits
include process elements such as women’s purported penchant for detail
and aversion to risk. There is also the potential that women’s alleged
concern for social welfare might lead to more socially minded corporations,
ones that may attend to the interests of weaker parties in market economies.
We previously observed a correlation between the intervention of the
legislature and the recent improvement seen in CAC 40 companies in terms
of gender equality. Further, we noted that this quantitative progress can be
evidenced through certain qualitative improvements, given the correlation
observed between the boards of directors and a certain degree of
rejuvenation and diversification of skills and points of view on how to run a
business. In addition, the introduction of more international profiles in the
French boards will diminish the presence of the solid networks of directors
of Grandes Écoles graduates, reduce the tendency towards a concentration
of monitoring structures, and prevent the risk of director-consanguinity. In
practical terms, the participation of women on boards of directors offers a
larger pool of skills and expertise than when the search for skills is limited
to the masculine gender.
Second, the inclusion of women on corporate boards at the mandated
critical mass levels may shift corporations toward an increased stakeholder
focus. In a simplistic, measurable, and identitarian fashion, women on
corporate boards will descriptively represent women workers,
customers/clients, and other stakeholder communities, even if the

225

There remains debate as to whether “sufficient diversity” should be required. Some argue that a
corporation, even a listed one, is still a private body and should, thus, be free to choose the members of its
board of directors or supervisory board. Direct intervention by public authorities or by the European
Commission in the composition of boards of directors seems neither realistic nor desirable. It appears that
such a result would best be achieved with recourse to corporate governance rules recommending greater
sociological diversity, which may include professionals, academics, foreigners, and stakeholders. The FCBQ
should help shift corporate governance towards more diversity.
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shareholders that elect them will drive most decision-making. The question
surfaces whether women on boards will actually represent a “women’s”
stakeholder interest. To make this assertion depends on the veracity of sex
stereotypes. Here, should certain stereotypical differences hold, women’s
presence on boards may be better for employees, as one French study
suggests. Women-inclusive boards may also focus more on long-term
economic results, thus resisting shareholder pressures to attend to shortterm profits. Such boards may also strike a more attentive posture toward
other communities. The possible shift toward stakeholder values may
result in gender quotas changing a great deal more than gender equality.
V. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTIVE TRANSATLANTIC CHASM
This Article has argued that the FCBQ will likely further shift French
corporate governance towards a stakeholder model. It has also asserted
that, as more European countries adopt their own CBQs, this shift may
occur in those countries as well. Thus, the end result may well be an even
more stakeholder-oriented European culture of corporate governance—one
that stands in marked contrast with the United States. Paradoxically, the
paucity of European theory of stakeholder governance appears to be offset
by the profusion of stakeholder practice in European corporate governance.
The reverse appears to be true in the United States, where shareholder
primacy reigns even in the wake of the financial crisis. It may have even
drawn additional strength within the United States as shareholders accrue
more power, through “say on pay” provisions, for example. Cultural and
sociological variations in the European context and that of the United
States underscore curious differences between the world’s largest
economies.
These findings contradict the assumption of prevalence, not to say
superiority, of one corporate governance model over another. Prior to the
financial crisis, it was customary to presume that the harmonization of
governance would lead to alignment of corporate governance across
economies and cultures. The discrepancies between shareholder theory and
practice within each of the world’s two largest economies reveal that this
harmonization is at best tenuous. Understanding the contrast between
shareholder and stakeholder-oriented practice matters because theory and
corporate governance transformation are strongly linked in the United
States. Additionally, the shareholder supremacy scholarship has been
influential in framing the rules, including those articulated in Dodd-Frank,
upon which the process of globalizing capital markets is based. It remains
to be seen whether the stakeholder orientation of European corporate
governance will remain solely descriptive or if it will encompass the
representation of interests as well. We have yet to observe whether the link
between CBQs and a stakeholder frame will remain a defining, uniquely
European focus for corporate legal governance, or whether this model will
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spread to other economies, thus reducing Europe’s distinctiveness with
respect to corporate governance. Although it was tempting to establish a
hierarchy of corporate governance theories,226 recent reforms undertaken in
European countries, most notably the FCBQ, demonstrate that we are not
far from the “End of Globalization,”227 especially in a post-crisis era.
Globalization brought with it rhetoric that rational transnational capital was
omnipotent and would force the harmonization of legal regimes across the
world’s major economies. The effects of FCBQ and similar laws to
reinforce the stakeholder/shareholder dichotomy suggest that the prospect
of a harmonized world of uniform corporate governance may be far from
inevitable.
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